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Abstract
The rise of social media has facilitated the diffusion of information to more easily
reach millions of users. While some users connect with friends and organically share
information and opinions on social media, others have exploited these platforms to
gain influence and profit through promotional campaigns and advertising. The exis-
tence of promotional campaigns contributes to the spread of misleading information,
spam, and fake news. Thus, these campaigns affect the trustworthiness and reliabil-
ity of social media and render it as a crowd advertising platform. This dissertation
studies the existence of promotional campaigns in social media and explores different
ways users and bots (i.e. automated accounts) engage in such campaigns. In this
dissertation, we design a suite of detection, ranking, and mining techniques. We
study user-generated reviews in online e-commerce sites, such as Google Play, to ex-
tract campaigns. We identify cooperating sets of bots and classify their interactions
vi
in social networks such as Twitter, and rank the bots based on the degree of their
malevolence. Our study shows that modern online social interactions are largely
modulated by promotional campaigns such as political campaigns, advertisement
campaigns, and incentive-driven campaigns. We measure how these campaigns can
potentially impact information consumption of millions of social media users.
vii
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Social media is one of the most powerful influencing tools in modern marketing.
Studies show that over 88% of US companies1 are using social media for marketing
purposes and their spending is expected to increase in the next years [11]. Facebook
and Twitter are the leading social networks in advertising. For example, 95% of Face-
book’s revenue came from their advertising system; that revenue totaled 26.88 billion
US dollars [5]. This illustrates the effective role social media plays in the marketing
world which, as a result, led promoters to target these platforms to reach a large au-
dience. This encouraged the presence of spamming content [80], sponsored activities
[43], and the spread of automated accounts that distribute misleading information
and fake news [40].
Social media has created virtual communities that gather users with mutual inter-
est and provide them with a platform to share information and content. Users can
instantly interact within their community in various means by following (a user’s
content), retweeting or sharing content, and liking posts, all with minimal effort.
Recently, social media has become a great platform for promotional activities. Typ-
ically, promoters try to engage as a member in the community, then start pushing
1companies with more than 100 employees
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information and promotional activities to achieve a goal, which could be related to
influencing public opinion in political topics, popularizing an ideology, or promoting
products.
In this dissertation, we explore different campaign strategies used in social media
and show their role in destroying the reliability of the network. We propose a suite
of detection, ranking, and mining techniques to identify promotional campaigns and
quantify the maliciousness of bots.
In Chapter 2, we investigate the incentivized reviews on mobile apps, where
users write biased reviews for some incentives, and we show how these reviews affect
app popularity and the incentive’s drawbacks in the review system. In Chapter 3, we
propose a technique to discover interacting bot-driven campaigns and perform multi-
aspect (i.e. temporal, textual, and graphical) clustering of bot behavior. Chapter 4
studies bot malevolence in Twitter; we use a deep learned model to produce a ranking
score that successfully predicts malicious bots. In the last chapter, we conclude with
a discussion of results and future implications.
1.1 Referral Incentives on App Reviews
In an online review system, a user writes a review with the intention of helping fellow
consumers (i.e. the readers) to make informed decisions. However, product owners
often provide incentives (e.g. coupons, bonus points, referral rewards) to the writers,
motivating the writing of biased reviews. These biased reviews, while beneficial for
both writers and product owners, pollute the review space and destroy readers’ trust
significantly.
In this work, we analyze a new type of promotional campaign called incentivized
reviews and identify a wide range of anomalous review types, such as copying, spam-
ming, advertising, and hidden-beneficiary reviews. We find that there are groups of
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users that have been consistently taking part in writing such abusive reviews. We
further find that such incentivized reviews indeed help the apps in gaining popularity
when compared to apps that do not provide incentives. We also identify an increas-
ing trend in the number of apps being targeted by abusers, which, if continued, will
render review systems as crowd advertising platforms rather than an unbiased source
of helpful information. This work is published in the 2017 IEEE/ACM International
Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining (ASONAM) and
the 2017 International Conference on Web Engineering (ICWE) [15, 16].
1.2 Bot-driven Interacting Campaign Detection
Bots are typically involved in social campaigns for two reasons: to inorganically
sway public opinion, and to build social capital, exploiting the organic popularity of
social campaigns. In the process, bots interact with each other and engage in human
activities (e.g. likes, retweets, and following). In this chapter, we study bot-driven
campaigns and analyze their various interactions.
We develop a technique to discover interacting bot-driven campaigns by combin-
ing existing bot detection and campaign detection systems. In general, we observe
similarity among the bots in a campaign in various aspects, such as temporal cor-
relation, sentimental alignment, and topical grouping. However, we also discover
bots compete to gain attention from humans, follow leads from human users, and
occasionally switch campaigns. Technically, we perform multi-aspect (i.e. tempo-
ral, textual, and graphical) clustering of bot behavior, and assemble the clusters to
identify co-operating sets of bots. Our empirical cases are on politics, sports, and
shopping domains. This work will be published in the 2019 International World
Wide Web Conference.
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1.3 Ranking Bot Malevolence in Twitter
Typically, bots are faster in exploiting social media than human users. While some
bots are benign in nature, others are malicious and invasive; they show suspicious
behavior and become involved in promotional activities that eventually lead to their
suspension. Therefore, there is a need to shift the focus from automated bots de-
tection to malicious bots detection since not all bots are bad; many of the bots are
created for entertainment and customer services purposes (e.g. chat-bot).
In this chapter, we propose a real-time ranking system to rank bots based on
the degree of their malevolence. We characterize bot behavior with different features
measuring their media bias, hate content, and suspicious URLs. We use a deep
learned model to produce a ranking score. The model is trained on a novel dataset
of suspended bots tracked over four months on Twitter. Our model achieves 94.29%
ranking-based average precision in ranking the bots and can predict malicious bots
successfully.
5Chapter 2
Referral Incentives on App
Reviews
2.1 Introduction
Online reviews help consumers to make informed decision with an assumption that
the review writers are an unbiased sample of past consumers. However, miscreants
have invented many ways to tamper with review systems to gain fake popularity for
certain products. Researchers have already found examples of fake reviews [63, 50],
omitted reviews [62], and user-review cliques [19]. Such reviews are almost always
caused by unethical activities outside of the hosting system, e.g. hiring black market
reviewers. In this work, we show a new form of tampering in the online review systems
which originates from many normal users writing reviews for rewards, points, and
bonuses, which we call incentivized reviews.
Providing incentives is a common marketing strategy. For example, in the Google
Play store, users are promised that if new users apply their referral codes, both new
and old users will get reward points to spend in that app or to redeem for cash or
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gift cards [24]. To increase the chance of success, users broadcast their referral code
by posting reviews, which is clearly not the intended purpose of a review system.
For example, Figure 2.1 shows a set of incentivized reviews in Google Play. The first
review is advertising a referral code of one app (i.e. Joy Rewards) in the review
space of another app (i.e. AppTrailers). The second row shows two reviews with
identical text and different referral codes. To understand the potential impact of such
incentivized reviews, let us consider the app com.tapgen.featurepoints. This app
has 6,037 reviews at the time of writing, and 2,147 (35.6%) of them are incentivized
reviews. The difference in the average rating between the incentivized reviews (4.73)
and the remaining reviews (4.08) suggests that the incentivized reviews and ratings
are creating an undesirable bias in the review system, which impacts the overall
trustworthiness of the reviews.
Figure 2.1: Top row: Referral reviews in Google Play found in an app called
AppTrailers. Note that the left review is advertising another app Joy Rewards.
Bottom row: two reviews with identical text, but different referral codes are shown.
Such incentivized reviews are growing in numbers.
Existing work on opinion and review mining focus on detecting fake reviews and
collaborative frauds. Incentivized reviews are different from fake reviews or paid
reviews. The incentive from spreading referral code via reviews is obtained from the
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product (i.e. app) owner, thus it is traceable. The fake and paid reviews are written
by abusers for untraceable incentives. All incentivized reviews are untrustworthy
for their monetary motivation, while some incentivized reviews are worse for their
spamming and adverse nature. Our goal, in this work, is to understand how abusers
are going beyond few random reviews to manipulating incentivized reviews, and thus
impact the trustworthiness of a review system. This study is one of the first to ask
the following questions: Are there anomalous/abusive/spamming reviews among the
incentivized reviews and how do we identify them? Are there collaborating groups
of users that are maximizing incentives by abusing the review system? Are there
apps that are targeted or benefited by the abusers? Answers to these questions are
extremely important for review systems, that can possibly take the following three
actions: delete abusive reviews, monitor abusive users and apps to prevent future
abuse, and protect target apps from the abusers.
To answer these questions, we collect and analyze incentivized reviews from the
Google Play store. We design a parsing pipeline that extracts app names and code
words mentioned in reviews with high precision. The key challenge in the extraction
process is that app names contain variable number of words of many forms (e.g. ab-
breviations, languages) and parts of speech. For example, it is hard to differentiate
the app name “Uninstall” from the phrase “uninstall”. Moreover, apps are added,
edited and deleted frequently in the Play store. We use a dictionary based tech-
nique to extract app names and code words in a highly precise manner. To identify
abusive incentivized reviews, we develop a novel relational ensembling technique for
outlier detection, that reduces bias in the resulting outliers by relating outliers from
multiple entities. Our method identifies a set of abusive incentivized reviews, such
as automated, spamming, targeting and hidden-beneficiary reviews. We further an-
alyze the review writers by applying graph mining techniques to identify groups of
users who are collaboratively targeting other apps to spread their referral codes. To
estimate the impact of incentivized reviews, we tracked the apps that provide incen-
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tives continuously for six months (October, 2015 - March, 2016). We discover that
the apps that employ a rewarding mechanism gain significantly high star-ratings and
downloads compared to those that do not.
Before going into further detail, we would like to emphasize that the Google Play
Marketplace is a huge ecosystem of reviews that is visited by over one billion Android
users. One may find our methods specialized to Google Play reviews, but we consider
this to be an acceptable specialization due to the sheer number of individuals using
this platform and facing the threat of incentivized review abuse. We would also
argue that identifying and analyzing incentivized reviews in other review systems
(e.g. iTunes) will require ad-hoc systems similar to ours, and are worth developing.
In the rest of the chapter, we first introduce in Section 2.2 the related work
and background. We describe the data collection and text processing algorithms in
Section 2.3. We describe our relational ensembling technique and resulting abusive
reviews in Section 2.4. We categorize the apps based on their parts in incentivized
reviews in Section 2.5. We analyze the users who write incentivized reviews in
Section 2.6.
2.2 Background and Related Work
A review is incentivized if the writer of the review gains any benefit in writing the
review. For example, the four incentivized reviews in Figure 2.1 are showing referral
codes, which, if used by some new users, can earn reward points for their writers.
Note that both the Android and iTunes platforms provide the functionality for in-
corporating a reward system in apps. In January 2016, Google began providing app
developers with lists of alphanumeric codes that can be used as promotional codes
[48], and Apple has been doing this for some time. This service encourages develop-
ers to use promotional codes. The apps we identified as rewarding apps were using
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these codes before Google provided the service; thus while we expect more apps to
start using this reward system, we have a snapshot of them in our dataset.
Current works focus on identifying fraud reviews and reviewers, while we focus
on understanding the (potentially abusive) impact of incentives on online reviews.
Existing work can be categorized based on the methodologies they adopt to detect
frauds. Fraud detection using graphical/ network structure is studied in [19, 26, 84,
36] where authors exploit network effects and clique structures among reviewers and
products to identify fraud. Text-based detection of fraud is studied to spot a fake
review without having the context of the reviewer and reviewed product[66, 51, 79].
Temporal patterns, such as bursts, have been identified as a fraudulent behavior
of businesses [87, 37, 88]. In contrast, our work looks at specific textual features
of incentivized reviews such as referral codes, app mentions, and keywords related
to a reward system. Our method also utilizes unique contextual features such as
the number of downloads, the number of reviews, and the average rating, which
help us gauge the impact of incentivized reviews. Our work is unsupervised, as we
do not have any ground truth or labeled data for anomalous incentivized reviews
(as ours is one of the earliest works). Many previous works employed unsupervised
techniques. In [86], hotels are ranked based on an unsupervised hedge algorithm. In
[38], hotels located in 21 big cities are analyzed to identify distributional anomalies.
In [51], reviews are analyzed using review-, reviewer-, and product-centric features.
In [36], authors have evaluated the crowdsourced manipulation of online reviews.
Our method is similar to those work on the broad theme of exploratory anomaly
detection.
The closest work to ours is finding fraud and malware apps in Google Play,
FairPlay [70]. The article discusses a method to automatically find such apps using
review-based features related to apps and their users. We focus more specifically on
incentivized reviews and consider finding abusive users and apps which are taking
part in this segment.
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2.3 Preprocessing
In this section, we describe our data collection process and the algorithms we use to
detect and parse incentivized reviews.
2.3.1 Data Collection
We have implemented a two-stage data collection process. In the first stage, we
searched in Google play store for apps that could potentially use incentives using
specific keywords. We have collected a set of 10,355 apps. For each app, we collect
up to 44801 of the most recent reviews. In the second stage, we develop an algorithm
to detect referral reviews and apps. We have identified 4,029 apps that have some
referral reviews. To understand how these apps benefit in gaining downloads and
positive ratings, we have monitored the apps continuously from October, 2015 to
March, 2016. For each app, we collect its metadata (e.g. app size, app description,
and rating) and developer information. The total number of reviews we have collected
is 14,555,502. Each review contains title, body, date, rating, and author. The total
number of unique users in our dataset is 10,327,089 users. In this stage, we have
collected 74,013 referral reviews with codes.
2.3.2 Extracting Codes
We develop an algorithm to detect incentivized reviews by identifying and extracting
codes from the reviews. Obviously other kinds of incentivized reviews may exist;
however, referral incentives are almost always implemented through promo codes,
which gives us a significant coverage on incentivized reviews.
1The limit is set by Google Play.
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To identify and extract codes from reviews, we first manually generate a blackList
and two whiteLists based on extensive examination of the dataset. The blackList
is used to identify reviews that likely contain an app code. Some example terms
from the blackList are: points, referral, free, and code. A whiteList is used to
identify reviews that may contain a string that could be confused for a referral code.
Note that we define two whiteLists: the first whiteList is for the ExtractCodes
algorithm which contains 35 words, and the second list is for the ExtractAppNames
algorithm, which contains 87 words. Some example terms from the whiteList include:
barcode, PayPal, and zip code. All lists are available at [9].
Our preprocessing step only retains English reviews that contain at least one
keyword from the blackList. In most development platforms, codes are random
sequence of numbers, alphabets, or combination of alphabets and numbers. We
develop ExtractCodes (shown in Algorithm 1) that extracts codes from reviews if
they exist. We first tokenize a review using whitespace and special characters and
extract these tokens from the review. We then perform three checks to test if a word
is a code. We first test if the word is a numeric word of length greater than 4. Such
numbers are almost always code words with exception of when they are game scores
or reward points.
We then check if the word contains both numbers and letters. In such cases,
we check if the digit(s) have been used as separators or short forms of words, e.g.
Pay2Park, Car4you and Pay2call. nexus6, mp3, galaxy4 and html5 are examples
of digits being used as parts of words. We tokenize the words further using digits as
separators, and check if the smallWords are in the dictionary or in the whiteList. If
so, the original word is labeled as valid. Note that, combinations of the smallWords
can be in the dictionary; however, we ignore such cases for simplicity.
We next check if the words contain only letters. Such words can be codes if
they are not in the dictionary and they are indicated as codes by some surrounding
symbols such as , [], (),−−, or a preceding symbol such as :,−. We identify such
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indicator symbols to avoid detecting misspelled words as codes. Since the word w is
already tokenized, we check for surrounding symbols in the original review.
Algorithm 1 ExtractCodes(a)
Require: a← a review
Ensure: c← extracted code if exists
1: words← Tokenize(a)
2: for each w ∈ words of length 5 to 13 do
3: if Numeric(w) then
4: return c← w
5: else if AlphaNumeric(w) then
6: smallWords← TokenizeDigits(w)
7: for each ww ∈ smallWords do
8: if ww ∈ Dictionary or ww ∈ whiteList then
9: flag ← 1
10: break
11: return c← w if flag 6= 1
12: else if Alphabetic(w) and w /∈ Dictionary and w has indicator symbol then
13: return c← w
14: return c← empty
2.3.3 Extracting AppNames
In addition to codes, abusive reviews also contain references to other apps. Knowing
the app that a review is referring to will help us to measure the impact of the reward
system in that referred app. We develop Algorithm 2 to extract apps names from
reviews.
Before extracting app names, our system generates a list of app identifiers from
the metadata (i.e. app title) collected from the Google Play website. Usually app
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names are long and app developers tend to put keywords in the title describing
functionality (e.g. Amazon for Tablets, AppCoins (How to make money), imo beta
free calls and text, Make Money - Earn Free Cash). When users refer to an app in
reviews they usually use the first couple of words without mentioning the whole title.
Algorithm 2 generates different app identifiers from each app’s title. In line 2, we
check if the title is in the dictionary. Sometimes apps are named by a single word
(e.g. Uninstall). Occurrences of such a word in review text are hard to classify as
reference to the app versus a normal use of the word. Therefore, we reject all single
word app titles, which form 17% of Google play store. It may seem large, however,
removing such names helps improving precision of the extraction process. In line 4,
we find words in the title by separated by whitespace and special characters. In line
5, we create an empty string and then, in line 9, we iterate over subsequent words
in the title. We keep appending the subsequent words to generate prefixes of the
title separated by spaces and add them to b. We discard non-English names and
too-short names (length less than 5) in line 10. We also consider special characters
in the title. Sometimes reviewers copy and paste app title in reviews. We ensure the
special characters are well represented in the identifier set for such pasting actions.
We do not show the steps in pseudo-code for simplicity. We have generated 20,682
app identifiers from 10,089 app titles. Each identifier is tagged with an appID that
connects the exact app with its identifiers. We use the identifiers in extracting app
names from reviews as described next.
Algorithm 3 takes the app identifiers and a review as input and outputs the app
name that appears first in the review. Line 1 uses a parser [67] that extracts the
nouns from a list of words. We exclude some nouns which appear more commonly
in reviews, but not in reference to other apps (line 2). For example, Lock screen,
SD Card and Ringtone are commonly used words which are also app names. The
algorithm iterates over reviews, extracts nouns and compound nouns, then appends
the same words after removing certain commonly used words (e.g. App, The, game).
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Algorithm 2 GenerateAppIdentifiers(a)
Require: a← a list of app titles
Ensure: b← a list of app identifiers
1: for each i ∈ a do
2: if i /∈ Dictionary then
3: b← i
4: t = Tokenize(i)
5: L← []
6: for next w ∈ t do
7: L← Append(L,w)
8: b← L if L /∈ Dictionary
9: for each j ∈ b do
10: if length(j) < 5 or Language(j) 6=′ en′ then
11: remove(j)
12: return b
Lines 3 through 7 iterates over the extracted nouns, and if any of these nouns is an
app identifier, the algorithm returns the identifier.
Algorithm 3 ExtractAppsNames(a, b)
Require: a← set of app identifiers, b← a review
Ensure: y ← app ID of the first app mentioned in b
1: n← Nouns(b)
2: n← RemoveWhiteNames(n)
3: for each word w ∈ n do
4: for each app identifier p ∈ a do
5: if w = p then
6: y ← getID(p)
7: return y
8: return empty
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Example: We give an example to demonstrate how the algorithm works. Let us
consider the review: Wow. just try Joy Rewards App and earnd points 4free
up to 500 points daily. use my referral code: X8YK67. First, the review
survives the preprocessing step because it has keywords from the blackList. The
identified keywords are: (points, referral, code). Then, we use ExtractCodes to
obtain the code. There are several possible codes to consider, which are (earnd,
500, 4free, X8YK67, 4, 8, 67). We first check the Numeric codes (500, 4, 8,
67), and since none of them satisfy the length requirement we ignore them. Next, we
look into AlphaNumeric codes; 4free will not be accepted since free is a meaningful
word in dictionary. Next, we check the other word, X8YK67, and produce three
possible words by TokenizeDigits method. Since none of the three words, (X,YK
or XYK), is a word in the dictionary, this code will be accepted and ExtractCodes
will return it. The algorithm will not consider the misspelled earnd as a code because
it does not have any surrounding symbols.
The next step is to look for AppNames in the review using the GenerateAppIden-
tifiers method. For the app Joy Rewards - Free Gift Cards, we will generate all
possible app identifiers, which are (Joy Rewards, Joy Rewards Free, Joy Re-
wards Free Gift, Joy Rewards Free Gift Cards, Joy Rewards - Free Gift
Cards). We will then extract the nouns and compound nouns from the review:
(Joy, Rewards, Joy Rewards, referral code, code, points) and match them
with the review. Here Joy Rewards App will be identified as an app name in this
review.
Evaluation: We evaluate the precision of our detection algorithms. We detect
promotional reviews with 91% precision and extract codes with 93% precision. We
detect and extract the app names with 95% precision. The precision values are
calculated over a unbiased sample of one hundred reviews evaluated by two judges.
Note that calculating the recall rate is impossible because there is no ground truth.
We also argue that our analysis does not depend on the recall rate as we have
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thousands of users, apps, and reviews, which are precise and large enough for accurate
statistical analysis.
Generalizability: The algorithms described in this section may appear to be
specialized for incentivized review mining in the Google Play store. However, the
high-level architecture of the system is easily generalizable with necessary domain
knowledge. For example, a domain expert can easily produce the whiteList, black-
List, and whiteNames lists for his domain. A similar identifier list for other entities
such as hotels, books, etc. are also available to domain experts. Thus, extracting
incentivized reviews in other systems can also be analyzed using our techniques.
2.4 Detecting Abusive Reviews
Incentives in writing reviews create a significant bias in the reviews, which results
in a distrust among the readers of the reviews. Yet, there are some incentivized
reviews that go beyond of being untrustworthy to being abusive, and require prompt
preventive actions. For example, there are apps that prompting users to submit pre-
written five-star reviews. Clearly, such reviews must not be counted in the average
rating or even shown to the readers. In contrast, many real users are posting just
one referral code in one review for one app, and sometimes such reviews contain
honest opinion (positive or negative). Our goal is to identify how the fraudsters are
manipulating incentivized reviews to maximize their interest.
To identify the abusive incentivized reviews, a simple approach is to find the
anomalous or outlying reviews by using an off-the-shelve outlier detection algorithm
on a sufficient set of features. The assumption that abnormal reviews are abusive
is generally true because writing a review is not an obligation, rather an optional
action. For the set of features, we can generate features related to a review’s title,
rating, body, author, app and posting date. For example, the length of the title, the
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number of words in the body and so on. We name such features as review-centric
feature following the convention described in [51].
The major challenge in the above naive approach is the absence of ground truth
data that can be used to train an outlier detection model. However, recent develop-
ment on the theory of outlier detection techniques discusses bias and variance of an
outlier detection method (as opposed to classification methods) and possible ways
to reduce them even in the absence of ground truth [18]. To reduce variance in
the outlier detection process, subspace-based methods are recommended. We adopt
the method described in [20], which uses subsets of features to evaluate outliers and
aggregate a score to rank the objects based on outlierness.
As hinted in [18], reducing bias is a difficult process unless prior information on
the set of features is known. Fortunately, in review data, there are three major enti-
ties whose relationships provide valuable prior information. In Figure 2.2, we show
the entity-relationship (E/R) diagram of our dataset. We exploit the relationships
among reviews, apps and users in two independent ways: generating novel features
to help the subspace anomaly detection methods reduce the variance, and creating
an ensemble of outlier detection methods to reduce the bias in the detection process.
2.4.1 Feature Generation
A simple way of generating features from a relational model is by aggregating on
various many-to-one or many-to-many relationships. Typically, in a review system,
the only relationship between the three entities is the Writes relationship which
describes “a user writing a review-text for an app.” In addition to the review-
centric features, we create aggregate features from the Writes relationship, such as
the average rating for a duplicated review text, number of users writing a review text
and number of apps receiving a review text. Aggregate features have been used to
detect anomaly independent of individual features [85], while our method generates
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Figure 2.2: Relationships among three entities: reviews, apps and users. Dark rela-
tionships are our novelty.
several aggregate features from the Writes relationship and use them in conjunction
with individual features. We also create app-centric and user-centric features, both
individual and aggregated, to detect abusive reviews. Examples include average
rating of an app and number of reviews written by a user. We name all of these
features as given-features to clarify that they are derived from the information
provided by Google.
In addition to the Writes relationship, our code and app name extraction tech-
niques enable two more relationships between the three major entities: Mentions and
Codes (shown in dark in Figure 2.2). Note that Codes is a many-to-many relation-
ship, which may appear unusual. However, we observe (code, user) pairs associated
with many review text and (review-text, code) pairs written by many users in our
dataset, validating the many-to-many cardinality. Similarly, the Mentions relation-
ship is a many-to-many relationship as many apps could be mentioned by many
review text. We create a set of aggregated features from these two relationships such
as the number of codes used per user and apps mentioned per review. We name these
features as novel-features to denote our contribution. Aggregate features based on
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Table 2.1: Novel Features of Review Entity.
Number of reviews Number of distinct apps
Standard deviation of review text rating Average of review text rating
Ratio of distinct apps Ratio of distinct codes
Ratio of distinct developers Number of distinct referred apps
Number of distinct codes Number of review referring apps
Number of distinct users Number of distinct dates
Code and Mentions capture the overall impact of a code word or app-name among
all the incentivized reviews.
We have generated a set of 23 novel features for reviews. In Table 2.1, we show
a subset of these features where we aggregate on review text. A set of 80 features is
included in the given feature set. A complete list of novel features developed in this
work is available at [9]. We normalize all features in the [0, 1] range and then apply
the Comprex algorithm [20] to find the anomalous score for each entity.
2.4.2 Relational Ensembling
To address the lack of ground truth and to reduce the bias in the outlier detection
system, we create an ensembling technique based on the relationship shown in Figure
2.2. We apply the subspace outlier detection method on the three entities indepen-
dently using disjoint sets of features. The process produces three ranked lists of
users, apps and reviews in order of their “outlierness.” We could define three dif-
ferent thresholds on scores to select top outliers from the three ranked list. Instead,
We define one parameter K as the number of top outliers that we suspect as truly
abusive. In effect, the choice matters very little as the order of the outliers are not
violated.
We define that an outlier review partially agrees with an outlier app if it was
Chapter 2. Referral Incentives on App Reviews 20
written in that app’s review page. Similarly we consider that an outlier review
partially agrees with an outlier user if the user has written that review. If a review
is in perfect agreement with both of its author and the app, it is more likely that
the review is a true outlier, and hence, an abusive one. In Figure 2.3(left), we
show the percentage of agreement between reviews, apps and users as we take top-K
abnormal instances from each of the lists. The key observation is that our novel-
features harness stronger agreement compared to the agreement produced by the
given-features among the three independently ranked lists of outliers. We also observe
that most outlier reviews (around 90%) have at least an outlier app or an outlier
user when we use our novel features.
Perspective reader may argue that larger agreement between independent meth-
ods shows a good reduction in bias, however, an agreement does not ascertain cor-
rectness. To evaluate the correctness we perform a manual investigation on the top-K
outliers by two human judges and calculate the average accuracy of our method. The
results are shown in Figure 2.3(middle). The precision of perfect agreement is higher
than the precision of partial agreement. In contrast, the recall of partial agreement is
higher than the recall of perfect agreement. This is just another form of bias-variance
trade-off in outlier detection, and is not surprising. We recommend a high precision
method (perfect agreement) for detecting and deleting abusive reviews. Thus, the
novel relational ensembling approach with our novel features, reduce the bias and
improves the precision in the outlier detection process.
2.4.3 Abusive Reviews
We perform a further analysis to categorize the top abnormal reviews and identify the
common abusive behaviors observed in incentivized reviews. We identify four forms
of abuse in incentivized reviews: copying, spamming, advertising and hidden-
beneficiary. We describe each of the categories below. In Figure 2.3(right), we show
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the percentages of these categories in the outlier reviews detected by our method.
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Figure 2.3: (left) Number of agreed outlier reviews using Given-features and Novel-
features for different sizes of the lists. (Middle) Recall and Precision for outlier
reviews against the parameter K. (right) Distribution of abusive review types in
detected outliers.
Copying Reviews: If an identical review appear in the same app by many users
promoting the same code, the most likely reason for such behavior is that a master
writer is copying or automatically posting the same review text from various user
accounts to increase his incentive. For example, we have found 117 almost identical
reviews that were written by 64 different users for the same app, com.ens.champcash,
promoting for the same code, 123900. The average rating is 4.9, and the reviews are
nearly identical with the following content: Please use our... REFER ID-123900
For 1.5$ Bonus ... & you just 1.5$ Bonus and refer us Friends to Earn
more and more. Clearly, these 64 users are all connected to each other to perform
such collaborative abuse, and the benefit belongs to a common master. Almost all
of these reviews rated the app 5-stars, improving the overall rating. We have found
727 (app, code) pairs where more than one user shared the same code.
Spamming Reviews: Typical spammers try to maximize earning from many apps
as opposed to repeatedly copying the same review in the same app. Such spamming
reviews are very common in Google Play reviews. We identify a user that reviewed
21 different apps with 21 different codes. Some spammers copy when spamming,
and show preferences for certain developer or type of apps. The user in this example
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wrote for 7 apps from NTT Solmare Corp. developer, 5 apps from Voltage, Inc.
developer, 4 from ＯＫＫＯ developer and the remaining 5 from アリスマティッ
ク developer. The average rating given by the user is high (4.62). Upon further
investigation we find 4983 users who have multiple codes in multiple apps.
Advertising Reviews: In both copying and spamming reviews, the code words used
in the reviews are valid in the app for which the reviews were written. However, to
maximize incentives miscreants have started abusing review pages of popular apps as
an advertisement board. For example, We find one of the outlier reviews repeating
288 times in 72 different targeted apps from 4 different users. The reviews have the
same content: Wow..... Just try Joy Rewards App Using this referral Code:
1816147 and earned points.. you can use the points for any games specially
The Clash of Clans.... This review is advertising for the app Joy Rewards. The
Joy Rewards app offers users rewards for downloading apps they recommend such as
The Clash of Clans, for sharing an invitation code with friends, and for running apps
and games for at least one minute. In exchange, the app promises to give users either
free PayPal Cash or free gift cards. In the app description, the developer requests
users not to spam their invitation code, however, it did not prevent miscreants to
advertise the app in other apps’ pages.
Advertising reviews generally rate the “targeted” app poorly with a hope to drive
people to the mentioned app. Target apps include Twitter, Amazon, Netflix, Google
and PayTM. We find at least 562 (user, code) pairs appearing in more than one
target apps.
Hidden-beneficiary Reviews: Some outlier reviews are mysterious because there
is no fixed beneficiary. For example, we find a user posting three different codes
(B7TJKQMN, BPJF65PY, S27QH315 ) for the same app named com.taskbucks
.taskbucks. We find 238 (app, user) pairs that have been associated with more than
one code. A user owning different code on the same app requires many downloads
from many devices. Even bots would not want to own many codes because gaining
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Table 2.2: Statistics for App Groups.
Benign Sources Targets Targets Non
-Promo -Promo -NonPromo -Promo
Number of Apps 3,408 25 126 361 6,328
Number of reviews 4,705,995 207,259 839,992 3,172,080 11,340,080
Number of Promotional Reviews 23,643 13,353 32,926 1,724 -
Average Rating 3.98 4.17 3.99 4.02 3.99
Standard Deviation Rating 1.46 1.39 1.48 1.45 1.45
Number of Unique Users 3,773,213 189,901 729,995 2,721,594 8,138,054
10¢ in 10 user accounts is not equivalent to a dollar in one account. A dollar can
buy an app while 10¢ cannot. An alternative explanation for this pattern is that the
reviewer is not necessarily trying to increase his earnings, but rather his goal is to
increase the average rating of the app, and, therefore, he re-posts the same 5-star
review, while only changing the code.
2.5 Comparing App Groups
In this section, we categorize the apps in five groups and perform a comparative study
to understand them better. The groups are: non-promoting, promoting, source, non-
promoting target, and promoting target apps. Below we formally define them.
Sources: Source apps are apps that have been mentioned in promotional or referral
reviews written on other apps’ review pages at least once. Source apps can have some
promotional reviews in their own pages. We find 25 such apps. In Figure 2.4(left)
we show the distribution of the source apps over various app categories in Google
Play. The most frequent source-type is entertainment, while source apps exist in six
other categories.
Promoting Targets: An app is “targeted” by a source app when users write reviews
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Figure 2.4: (left) Source Apps Categories. (right) Growth trends of three groups of
apps related to incentivized reviews.
in the target app about promotions in the source app. If a target app has a rewarding
system implemented, we call them promoting targets. A promoting target app can
also be a source app in some reviews. We use a threshold of minimum five targeted
reviews to separate a source from a promoting target. We find 126 apps in this
category.
Non-promoting Targets: Non-promoting targets are apps whose review page has
been abused by some reviewers and have not implemented a rewarding system. We
find 361 apps that are being targeted “by” source apps. These apps are mostly pop-
ular apps from top developers including Skype, Facebook, Twitter, Google, Amazon
and eBay.
Benign-Promoting Apps: Benign promoting apps a have rewarding system im-
plemented and have reviews with promotional or referral codes. However, they are
not sources or targets. We have 1150 apps in this category. We call the apps benign
to distinguish them from the sources and targets. In reality they are also abused by
the reviewers.
Non-Promoting Apps: A set of randomly selected 6,328 apps that have no referral
or promotional codes in reviews. We have collected the reviews for non-promoting
apps during the period between October 2015 to March 2016.
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Table 2.2 shows the summary statistics for the five app groups. Source apps
have the highest average rating with the lowest variance.
Figure 2.5: Comparison among the five app groups based on four features.
2.5.1 Feature Comparison
We compare the five groups of apps based on their total number of reviews, number of
downloads, burstiness and the number of promotional reviews. We show the results
in box-plots in Figure 2.5. We show the min, max, median, and quartiles in the
box-plots.
Based on the number of reviews, we see that the apps participating in reward
systems have more reviews than random non-promoting apps. We also observe that
the source and target apps have a greater median number of reviews than the benign
promoters (see Figure 2.5 left.).
Considering the number of downloads, target apps are more popular than source
apps, which explains why they are targets. Non-promoting and benign apps are
very similar in the number of downloads, while source apps have significantly greater
downloads than benign and non-promoting apps. This can be a demonstration of
their successful referral reward systems, which are earning them a large number of
downloads (see Figure 2.5 second-left).
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In [62][37], authors have shown that bursts of reviews indicate spamming activi-
ties. We measure the maximum and average number of reviews an app has received
in a day and take their ratio as a measure of “burstiness.” We see a relatively high
burstiness in source apps compared to the benign promoters. Non-promoting targets,
which are also popular apps, show similar burstiness as source apps. (See Figure 2.5
second-right).
If we only consider the number of promotional reviews, we identify that benign
apps have very few promotional reviews while source apps have a large number of
such reviews. This is a significant difference that motivates further analysis on the
source apps. Target apps, although having large number of total reviews, show much
less promotional reviews compared to the source apps because target apps mostly do
not have their own referral systems (Figure 2.5 right).
Although we categorize source and target apps separately based on the reviews
they have received, we have no evidence to say that the app owners have initiated
such reviews.
2.5.2 Trend Comparison
As we demonstrate significant difference between the app groups, we need to under-
stand if the number of apps in the source and target groups are increasing. We show
in Figure 2.4(right) the trends for each group over the six months period of data
collection. We observe that source apps are growing at a much smaller rate than the
target apps. Most alarming fact is that the non-promoting target apps have almost
doubled in six months. This suggests that we need to save non-promoting apps from
abusive reviewers of promoting apps.
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2.6 Discovering Abusive User Groups
In this section, we analyze the users who participate in writing incentivized reviews.
We apply graph mining techniques to discover user groups who are involved in collab-
orative abuse. We also perform temporal analysis to understand trends in the users
who are writing incentivized reviews. We create three different graphs connecting
the review writers: app-graph, text-graph and code-graph.
App-graph: Two reviewers writing reviews for the same source app are connected
by an edge. We expect a random graph to be formed in an unbiased review system
where the reviewers mention other apps randomly without any bias.
Text-graph: We use Levenshtein distance [82] as a metric to measure text similarity.
We set an error threshold of 6 for the distance function to allow an approximately
10% difference in a review as the average review length is 75 characters. An edge is
added between two users if at least one pair of promotional reviews between the users
has a distance less than or equal to the threshold. As shown in the Introduction,
there are near duplicate reviews in the app reviews. The major reason for near
duplicates is that writing an identical review to the most “helpful” review increases
the chance of being ranked highly in the review page. If a group of users are posting
similar text, we investigate further to identify if they are copying from each other.
We find 6237 reviews where only 401 unique templates are used by just changing the
code part. The templates range from 6 to 497 characters in length, not including the
code.
Code-graph: We add an edge between two users if they promote the same code.
Codes are generated at random in an unbiased system, such edges, therefore, should
not exist. However, we find many users who post the same code. Thus, code-graph
creates an opportunity to spot groups of abusive users.
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Table 2.3: 12 User Names from code-clique.
Shreya Gupta Shreya Gupta chetan sahu chetan sahu
Nancy Gupta samita sah Bhavna Sharma Harvey Dend
John Smith Faqat Khan Sagar Sharma Ankita Diwan
2.6.1 Clique Discovery
We use the igraph package for network analysis and visualization to create the graph
and find cliques [32]. We consider a clique only if it has at least 3 users and set a
minimum edge weight of 1 to find the cliques.
We describe the largest cliques we have found in the three graphs defined above.
In the app-graph, the largest clique was of size 346 users, which means all these users
were referring to some common apps (not necessarily the same). In the text-graph,
36 users form the largest clique, and in the code-graph, the largest clique contains 65.
we observe that the app-clique is disjoint to the code-clique and text-clique, while
text-clique is a subset of the code-clique.
We perform a qualitative check on the code cliques. A random subset of 12
users is shown in Table 2.3. 100% of the reviews these users have ever written are
promotional reviews, 82% have exactly 2 distinct codes and the remaining have one
codes and they all share the same codes (123900 and 201470). Three users have the
same name and profile picture and 72% users have changed their profile names at
least once.
2.6.2 Clique Properties
To perform more principled analysis on the cliques, we select a stricter edge weight
of 10 and find the extreme incentivized users. We find 317 cliques in the app-graph,
37 cliques in the code-graph, and 6 cliques in the text-graph. For each graph, we
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compare the users participating in any clique against the remaining users who did
not participate in cliques. We use the percentage of distinct codes over the number
of promotional reviews. If the percentage is 100%, it means the reviewers are not
reusing codes in their reviews. If the percentage is 20%, it means the reviewers are,
on average, writing five reviews per referral code. We show the CDF (cumulative
distribution function) of this metric over all the users who are in some clique (see
Figure 2.6). We also show the CDFs for users who are not in any clique. There is
a significant difference between the CDFs for all of the three cliques, demonstrating
that the users forming cliques are reusing promotional codes in multiple reviews.
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Figure 2.6: left: Size distribution of code-cliques over time, Remaining: Empirical
CDFs for the three graphs.
We show the size distribution of the cliques from the code-graph in Figure
2.6(left). Naturally we have large number of small cliques and a few large cliques.
We show three distributions for three datasets accumulated at two months interval.
We identify a trend in both number and size of the cliques. This is an alarming
indication that the number of abusers are growing rapidly.
2.7 Conclusion
We identify a new type of promotional campaigns in review systems. Mobile apps
support referral rewards, which create opportunities for users to write incorrect,
untruthful, and abusive reviews. In this chapter, we identify several anomalous
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usages of incentivized reviews, detect abusive users, and analyze them to reach the
following conclusion: ? Groups of abusive users are targeting popular apps’ review
pages to advertise non-popular apps. ? The number of such abusive users is rapidly
increasing, endangering the overall utility of a review system. ? Apps indirectly
benefit from incentivized reviews in terms of the number of reviews and downloads.
For future work, we will cross-match our results with other published lists of abusive
users.
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Chapter 3
Bot-driven Interacting Campaign
Detection
3.1 Introduction
Social networking sites bring people closer to each other and facilitate fast and conve-
nient information flow. However, modern social media sites suffer from user accounts
that work towards fast and automated building of social capital and exploiting the so-
cial influence to sway public opinion. Such user accounts (commonly named as bots)
perform scheduled posting [78], near-automated registrations [81], and chronological
deletions [29] among many other unsocial and non-human behavior.
To multiply the effect, instead of creating super smart bots, botmasters employ
a large number of naive bot accounts to attain their objectives. Not surprisingly,
humans tend to believe repeatedly encountered information from diverse sources
[68]. Thus, a swarm of bots can potentially run successful advertising campaigns to
promote products, election campaigns to win races, and organizational campaigns
to recruit for ideological groups. To understand the fullest potential of a swarm
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of bots, in this chapter, we perform an empirical study on bot activities in social
campaigns and develop a technique to detect and classify bot-driven interactions
in social campaigns. Quantifying bot-driven interactions in social campaigns can
be useful for political parties, advertising agencies, charitable organizations among
many others. Early detection and characterization of bot participation in campaigns
will help campaigns flourish organically.
Figure 3.1: An example of bot interactions. Politically motivated bots are discussing
trend manipulation.
An example of bot behavior in Twitter at the time of U.S. Presidential Election in
2016 is given in Figure 3.1. The user account @JaredWyand was an active supporter of
Trump campaign. The account has been detected by both DeBot [27] and Botometer
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[33] systems due to its high frequency of tweets and content similarity. The account
is currently suspended by Twitter. The tweet shown here has been retweeted 1.2K
times. The two other users copied the tweet shortly after that [17]. These users are
also detected as bots by DeBot 1 and Botometer2, however, they are not suspended by
Twitter at the time of writing. The content of the tweets shows that bot accounts are
promoting a specific topic in Twitters ranking system by frequently tagging relevant
hashtags. The content shows that bot accounts are tracking progress of competing
political campaign. Note that every bot account has a human owner who can post
in natural language in between scheduled posts.
The example demonstrates that bot accounts collaborate towards an objective
(i.e. making a topic trending). It also demonstrates that bots exhibit negative
sentiments towards competing campaigns.
In this work, we develop a system to detect bot-driven interaction in campaigns
categorized by general topics. For example, we have detected five major campaigns
interacting under the “U.S. Election 2016 topic”. Three of the bot-driven campaigns
are taking sides of the candidates. The objective of the two of the remaining bot-
driven campaigns is to gain human attention by adopting popular topics such as
U.S. Election. Our system, named BotCamp, continuously collects bots for a given
topic and detects bots using the DeBot system [27]. BotCamp identifies bots that
are posting similar content on the campaign topic, and accumulates such bots over a
long time to create graph structures on various aspects such as retweets, mentions,
shared media and hashtags. We develop a heuristic cluster ensembling approach to
combine communities detected from these graphs, which leads to discovering bot-
driven interactions.
In this work, we have collected bot activities related to social campaigns in three
different domains: politics, sports and e-commerce (see Table 3.1). We have detected
1www.cs.unm.edu/ chavoshi/debot/
2https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu
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Table 3.1: Summary of the three datasets.
U.S. Election Baseball Black Friday
Collection Duration 60 days 10 days 9 days
Number of bots 29,840 1,547 3,532
Number of tweets 75,512,952 1,457,054 2,195,790
Category politics sport shopping
several bot-driven campaigns in each of these domains. We analyze the campaigns
to understand their information flow, sentiment towards the topics and status after
campaigns are over. All data and code are made public [8].
The rest of the chapter contains a discussion section in related work and back-
ground (3.2), an overview section describing the framework (3.3), an experimental
section showing ensembling and interaction classifier evaluation (3.4), a section for
campaigns, interaction, and leaders (3.5) to discuss qualitative results, and the last
section concludes the work (3.6).
Disclaimer: We do not address the question, “who” create and operate bot
accounts. We define bots as the accounts that show signs of automation. We collect
empirical evidence of “how” bots are involved in social campaigns and reason about
“why” bots are involved. To the best of our knowledge, this work is one of the very
first to generalize bot interactions on social media.
3.2 Related Work and Background
3.2.1 Related Work
Our work combines two independent streams of research on social media: campaign
detection and bot detection. Campaign detection works mostly focus on finding
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campaigns based on one specific aspect of messaging, such as message similarity
[55][54][71], URL bursts [57], retweet structure [44]. We combine several other mes-
saging aspects such as mentions, hashtags, and media sharing. All of these works
detect clusters/communities in some messaging graphs. Such communities may in-
clude both bots and humans, hence existing work cannot separate the bot-driven
part of the campaign.
DARPA Bot Challenge suggests an estimated 15% of Twitter accounts are bots
[77]. Existing bot detection techniques are either supervised [33][39] and unsuper-
vised [27]. Since our goal is to identify campaign specific bots, we opt for an unsu-
pervised technique, DeBot [27].
Bot activities related to campaigns have been studied previously that associated
bot activities with political entities [42][14][76]. Our goal is to explore beyond politics
to sports, entertainment, marketing, etc., at a much larger scale of thousands of bot
accounts.
Bots have been categorized based on their roles as individual users, independent
of campaigns they take part in [65]. In contrast, we categorize bots based on their
type of interactions in social campaigns.
3.2.2 Social Campaigns
Definition of campaign has been diverse in the literature, mostly attributed as un-
ethical and illegal cases of social campaign. For example, coordinated campaigns
[55], spam campaigns [35], promoted campaigns [41], and fraud campaigns [25] are
some of the characterizations of campaigns.
In general, we define a social campaign as a group of concepts aligned to an ob-
jective that a group of people want to achieve. For example, #antivax and #autism
are concepts supported by people who want to abolish vaccination. Another example
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is a fund-raising campaign started by Peter Dunn (@PeterThePlanner) in Indiana to
support homeless people immediately before a blizzard hit Indianapolis. $41K was
raised organically from various organizations and individuals for @WheelerMission.
Therefore, a social campaign should not be perceived as purely inorganic or organic.
Instead, considering that both humans and bots are involved together, we propose
to quantify the level of bot and human participation in social campaigns. Quantify-
ing organic participation in campaigns can be useful for political parties, advertising
agencies, charitable organizations among many others.
3.2.3 Bot Detection
Automated accounts, a.k.a bots, are tweeting/re-tweeting always. Bots are controlled
by computer programs. There may exist automated accounts which are not harmful
such as @countforever, but most bots pretend to be human, entice people to follow
them, and/or share ideas. DeBot is a parameter-free unsupervised system [27], that
constantly collects data from Twitter and detects bots based on their synchronicity
at intervals of 180 minutes. Number of bots DeBot detects in an interval depends on
the topic, time of day, bot presence and sampling rate. Note that, Twitter streaming
API provides a 1% of sample. In a successful interval, DeBot detects few bot-clusters
containing tens of bots.
DeBot is a near real-time system that exploits highly unusual activity correlation
across users as an indicator of bot behavior. The authors show that even if millions of
active users interact at a time instance, human users are not likely to have more than
tens of synchronous postings at random [28]. Although we use DeBot as an integral
part of the detection system, we can replace DeBot by any other topic-specific near
real-time system.
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3.3 Bot Interactions in Campaigns
3.3.1 The Framework
Figure 3.2 shows the BotCamp framework. There are three components of the sys-
tem: Keyword Generator, Campaign Detector and Interaction Detector. We describe
each of the components below.
Keywords
Trending	Hashtags
yes
related	? Time	Synchronized
Bots
Content	
Matching
DeBot
Keyword	Generator Micro-campaign	Detector
Retweet Mention HashtagMedia Temporal
Graph	Clustering	and	Ensembling
Campaign	Detector
Interaction
Detector Boosted	Decision	Trees
Figure 3.2: BotCamp framework.
Keyword Generator: BotCamp continuously collects trending hashtags to main-
tain related keywords to a seed set of keywords. The motivation behind such a
keyword generator is to adapt with changing campaign dynamics. Trending key-
words related to a campaign can be changed frequently. For example, to monitor
the U.S. election, we started with a seed of twenty keywords including general top-
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ics such as election, Trump, Clinton, etc. After the U.S. election, the seed set
grew to 231 keywords including MAGA (“short form of Make America Great Again”),
PodestaEmails, and CrookedHillary. We collect the top 50 trends in twitter in
every three-hour interval. If more than 50% of the tweets containing a trend also
contains a seed keyword, we add the trend to seed set. In short campaigns, the
seed set remains almost identical for the lack of dynamics in the campaigns. In
long campaigns (i.e. election campaigns), keywords can be weighted based on their
recency. The keywords can be both in support or in favor of parties involved in a
campaign. We have labeled the sentiment associated with the keywords manually
for all datasets.
Campaign Detector: We use the keywords in an instance of DeBot system that
detects synchronized bots within an interval of three hours. We use the recommended
threshold of 0.99 correlation to detect bots. DeBot outputs clusters of bots that we
further analyze to detect clusters of bots that are both temporally synchronous and
textually similar. BotCamp accumulates bots for a duration that is sufficient for the
campaign to reach a stable state. We have accumulated at least one week of bots for
all of our experiments. After bots are collected, we produce five graphs capturing
various aspects of campaigns (e.g. retweet graph, hashtag graph, etc.). BotCamp
detects communities in these graphs based on modularity optimization algorithm
[21]. We develop a cluster ensembling technique that combines the communities
from different aspects into consensus communities representing campaigns.
Interaction Detector: BotCamp consists of a classifier that categorizes the inter-
action between pairs of campaigns. The classifier is trained on a manually labeled
set of interactions. We consider two types of interactions: agreeing and disagreeing
interactions. We produce a set of 94 novel features that are indicative to various in-
teraction types. The classifier is AdaBoost ensemble classifier, we use the classifier to
categorize all possible pairs of interacting campaigns, and quantify bot participation
in a campaign.
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In the next two sections, we elaborate on the the campaign and interaction de-
tectors.
3.3.2 Campaign Detector
Our campaign detection system is a two step process: Content matching and Graph
clustering.
Content Matching
DeBot produces a set of unusually synchronous bots. Although a group of unlikely
synchronous bots typically works towards a campaign, there can be spurious syn-
chronous groups that are just naively periodic. In this step, we detect bots that are
posting not only at close time instances, but also similar content. We consider each
synchronous cluster detected by DeBot, and calculate the text and hashtag similarity
among the bots in the cluster. Text similarity between two users u and v is defined
by the Jaccard similarity of their set of unigrams. More precisely, if G(u) is the set
of unigrams extracted from the tweets made by u, excluding the stop words, the text
similarity between u and v is:
SimText(u, v) =
G(u) ∩G(v)
G(u) ∪G(v)
The similarity within a cluster C is
SimText(c) =
∑
∀u,v∈C SimText(u, v)
|C| ∗ (|C| − 1)/2
Hashtag similarity between two users u and v is defined by the Jaccard similarity
of their set of hashtags. More precisely, if H(u) is the set of hashtags made by u, the
hashtags similarity between u and v is:
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SimHashtag(u, v) =
H(u) ∩H(v)
H(u) ∪H(v)
The hashtag similarity within a cluster C is
SimHashtag(C) =
∑
∀u,v∈C SimHashtag(u, v)
|C| ∗ (|C| − 1)/2
C
o
u
n
t
Micro-Campaign Size
Figure 3.3: Micro-campaign size distribution for the three datasets.
We define a micro-campaign as a cluster of temporally synchronous bots, C,
having either SimText(C) ≥ 0.5 or SimHashtags(C) ≥ 0.5. Note that such micro-
campaigns are formed based on three hours of information. Figure 3.3 shows the
distribution of the micro-campaign sizes in the three datasets, the largest micro-
campaign is of size 109. The average cluster size is 2.3 and the median is 2. By
looking at the distribution of users participating in campaigns, we can notice that
75% have appeared in one campaign while the rest has participated in more than
one, almost 5% appeared in more than five campaigns and the maximum occurrence
of a user is 174 different campaigns.
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Graph Construction
Once BotCamp accumulates micro-campaigns detected in three hour batches for over
the duration of the campaign, the system creates five graphs namely: retweet, media,
hashtag, mention and temporal graphs. The objective is to study the underlying
interaction among micro-campaigns on various aspects over the duration of the cam-
paign. Since the graphs are based on three hour long captures, the graphs are crude
approximations of the graphs that we could produce if we had all data available. We
describe each of these graphs below.
1. Retweet Graph: Retweets usually mean endorsement. Hence, we create a
undirected retweet graph where nodes are bots, and we add an edge between
two bots when they retweet from each other at least once, encoding their mutual
endorsements. In contrast, we can create a directed retweet graph by adding
edges from the retweeting node to the original author node.
2. Mention Graph: In public conversations, bots mention (i.e. adding @ before
an account name) other accounts in tweets. Mentions are typically used to
draw attention of the person being mentioned. Thus, mentions are useful to
express agreement, disagreement, endorsement, promotion, etc. We create a
mention graph by adding an edge between two bots if they mentioned each
other.
3. Media Graph Bots in the same campaign proliferate the same information.
Memes, photos, and videos are typically more expensive to create compared
to tweets, however, such media are more attractive. Determined campaigns
spend resources to create media and employ automated accounts to share the
media. We create the media graph on bots by connecting two bots that share
the exact same URL media.
4. Hashtag Graph Hashtag is a powerful way to organize content for better
searching. Information seekers often use hashtags to learn discussion items
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about a topic. Competing campaigns fight for strong position on common dis-
cussion topics (e.g. #Oscars). Campaigns also want to make hashtags trending
(See Figure 3.1). Thus, tagging the same hashtag may mean either agreement
or disagreement; at weaker level than mentions. If two bots have more than
50% of their hashtags common (i.e. SimHashtags(u, v) = H(u)∩H(v)
H(u)∪H(v) ≥ 0.5),
we add an edge between them to create the hashtag graph.
5. Temporal Correlation Graph Synchronous bot activities indicate that bots
using the same scheduler (e.g. a random posting interval generator or a human
leader). We add an edge between two bots if they have been correlated at least
once in their campaign lifetime for three hours interval regardless of their con-
tent similarity. Since we are using Debot we know that all bots are temporally
correlated at least once with other bots, however, this graph exposes further
correlations that could happen along the campaign life duration.
Graph Clustering and Ensembling
We consider building larger campaigns from the micro-campaigns by clustering the
individual graphs mentioned in the previous section and ensembling the clusters
across various aspects.
To cluster the graphs, we use a state-of-the-art technique called Louvain Modular-
ity to cluster bots [21]. The algorithm uses greedy modularity optimization method
and has linear complexity, thus it run fast on large dataset. We run the algorithm on
the five graphs respectively. For each graph, we produce clusters of bots, therefore,
each bot will belong to five clusters of various aspects.
Ensembling clusters from the five graphs enable detection of interesting patterns
that independent aspect alone cannot reveal. We propose an ensembling method to
detect campaign. First, we define a dissimilarity matrix A between bots participating
in a campaign, where we compute the pairwise distance between two bots as:
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Ai,j = 1− ‖Community(i) ∩ Community(j)‖‖Community(i))‖
Where Community(i) refers to the set of communities that user i belongs to. The
resulting distance matrix A contains normalized values range between 0 to 1. Where
0 indicates that the two bots appeared in the same cluster in all graphs, and 1
means the two bots did not appear in any common cluster. Next, we use average
linkage hierarchical clustering to cluster bots and choose a restrictive threshold to
stop unnecessary cluster merging. The merging starts with the most similar bots
and stop when threshold is 0.8. The selected threshold is chosen because it ensemble
bots in one community if all bots share one common community on average with all
other bots within the campaign. For verification, we conducted a small experiment
on a sample of labeled bots in the U.S. Election, where labels are either Trump or
Clinton supporter, we used different threshold and reported the Normalized Mutual
Information (NMI) with the labeled data. the largest NMI was reported at 0.8. In
the next section, we show the performance evaluation of the Ensemble cluster with
the selected threshold.
3.3.3 Interaction Detector
Once we find a set of campaigns, we are interested to study the interactions among
them. The simplest starting point is to consider pair-wise interactions. We con-
sider developing a machine learned classifier to automatically classify interactions in
agreeing and disagreeing categories.
We label interactions between a pair of campaigns by manually checking the
tweets, replies and retweets where bots from both campaigns participated. Such
interactions can be largely categorized in two classes: agreeing and disagreeing. The
example in the Introduction can be treated as a disagreeing interaction between the
Chapter 3. Bot-driven Interacting Campaign Detection 44
Trump and Clinton supporting bots. One may consider creating a full scale of classes
between -3 and 3, 0 being the neutral class, instead of a two-class problem. However,
the cost associated with labeling hundreds of pairs of campaigns is significant. In
contrast, any neutral interaction can also be thought of as weak agreement, and thus,
a two-class formulation is chosen. We manually labeled 80 campaign interactions
where 57.5% are disagreement interaction and 42.5% are agreement.
Feature Generation and Selection
We start with a set of 94 features. The features are from four categories: time-based,
sentiment-based, user-based features and network-based features. We describe a
subset of features from each category below.
1. Time-based Features: Temporal features help revealing bots that are collabo-
ratively working toward the same objective or operated by the same software.
Features such as the number of temporally correlated bots can be useful to un-
derstand the relation between a pair of campaign. Similarly, average interval
time between mentions and number of bots involved in conversational interac-
tion can indicate the interaction type. Usually, long conversations with small
intervals between mentions can be an indication for argument and disagree-
ment.
2. Sentiment-based Features: While retweet interaction almost always indicates
agreement, mention interaction is controversial in nature. Bots and cyborgs
could engage in arguments to support or attack a certain topic. To understand
the nature of these conversations, we investigate entities sentiment within each
conversation using IBM Watson Natural Language Understanding API [13].
For each conversation, we create various features describing the number of
sentiment disagreement and difference of average sentiment over all entities to
understand bots opinion polarity towards topics.
3. Content-based Features: Usually, campaigns that share common objective tend
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to have more agreement than disagreement towards specific topics, and vice
versa. We create features that characterize the relationship between two inter-
acting campaigns. Examples include number of common topics, hashtags and
media between two campaigns.
4. Network-based Features: In addition to these three categories, we summarize
bots and campaign connectivity using features that describe network topology
such as the ratio of friends to followers.
Although indirect interactions are possible, we consider only direct interactions
in the forms of retweets and mentions between campaigns. We obtain 94 features
from four categories. We perform feature selection to identify the best features based
on their importance weights in a decision tree model using Gini importance. After
feature selection, the set is reduced to 15 features. Most informative features are
content-based, temporal-based and sentiment-based features. The complete list of
features is available in the supporting webpage [8].
Training the Classifier
We employ an AdaBoost model trained on decision tree classifier (CART) with ten
weak learners. Information Gain is used to measure the quality of splits, then predic-
tions from different learners are combined using weighted majority vote to produce
the final prediction. Our choice for Adaboost is a result of lack of labeled data.
Quantifying the sentiment of an interaction needs significant effort because of short
length of tweets (The character limit for tweets is 280) and many alternative usages
(emoji, abbreviation, etc.). Boosting the decision tree helps tackle these challenges.
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3.4 Experimental Evaluation
3.4.1 BotCamp by Numbers
We describe the BotCamp framework in numbers for the U.S. Election campaigns.
First, we start with 20 seed keywords, the keyword generator component expands
the set to 231 keywords in 60 days. Using the campaign detector, we collect a set
of 75 million tweets from 6 million users talking about the election. The number
of bots detected is 120K. We exclude clusters that are not matching in content and
identify 29K bots from different micro-campaigns. We construct five graphs: retweet
(7162 bots with 30811 edges), mention (1137 bots with 785 edges), hashtags (4122
bots with 731687 edges), media (954 bots with 10385 edges) and temporal (29840
with 73623). Graph clustering and ensembling are performed to obtain clusters of
29K bots and ensemble them into 231 campaigns. From the interaction classifier, we
identify 87 disagreement interactions and 2700 agreement interactions between bot
campaigns. Table 3.1 shows a summary of the BotCamp in numbers for the three
datasets.
The above set of numbers are reproducible using the dataset provided in our
supporting webpage [8]. However, U.S. Election 2016 has already happened, which
limits comparison to alternative methods. To facilitate experimental comparison, we
made our code public in the supporting webpage, it only requires a set of keywords
to run for days to weeks, and produce interacting campaigns.
3.4.2 Evaluation of Ensembling
One of the known techniques to ensemble clusters is Cluster Ensembles [74]. The
method combines multiple clusters into a consensus cluster, by using three heuristics:
Cluster-based Similarity Partitioning Algorithm (CSPA), HyperGraph Partitioning
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Table 3.2: Comparison between our method and Cluster Ensemble.
Mutual Information
U.S. Election Baseball Black Friday
BotCamp Ensemble 0.814 0.915 0.910
Cluster Ensemble Failed 0.893 0.832
Average Rand Index
U.S. Election Baseball Black Friday
BotCamp Ensemble 0.279 0.282 0.241
Cluster Ensemble Failed 0.223 0.224
Maximum Rand Index
U.S. Election Baseball Black Friday
BotCamp Ensemble 0.625 0.897 0.617
Cluster Ensemble Failed 0.817 0.747
Algorithm (HGPA) and Meta-CLustering Algorithm (MCLA). The method evaluates
the three heuristics using the weighted average of the mutual information with the
known labels of initial clusters, and pick the one with the highest score. We use the
implementation provided in Python package Cluster Ensembles [45] to compare
with our ensembling technique and measure the goodness of our proposed ensemble
method.
We compare the predicted labels from both ensembling approaches using three
metrics:
1. Weighted average of the mutual information.
2. Average adjusted Rand index.
3. Maximum adjusted Rand index.
Normalized mutual information between two label assignments is defined as:
NMI(U, V ) =
MI(U, V )√
H(U)H(V )
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Where H is the entropy for the amount of uncertainty for a partition set, and MI
is the mutual information between two sets. We compute the weighted average of
the mutual information with the known labels from the graph clustering labels, the
weight is proportional to the fraction of known labels of a cluster, as some clusters
could have unassigned labels for some entities.
For the adjusted Rand index, we compare the predicted labels with the graph
clustering labels. The adjusted Rand index is defined as:
ARI = (RI − Expected RI)/(max(RI)− Expected RI)
Where RI is the Rand index. Table 3.2 shows the three metrics evaluation.
Our method outperforms the Ensemble Clusters. For the Rand index, we find that
retweets and temporal clusters score the highest agreement with the predicted labels.
This shows the importance of these graphs in detecting campaign.
To find the best threshold for hierarchical clustering, we test the mutual infor-
mation against different values to find the best cutoff that merges the clusters while
maximizing mutual information score.
3.4.3 Evaluation of Interaction Classifier
We evaluate the boosted decision tree classifier using a 10-fold cross-validation tech-
nique. The average and standard deviation of classification performance is described
in the Table 3.3. The results strongly suggest that the feature set can capture the
manually labeled training data. The low standard deviation suggests consistency
across random samples.
We consider applying the classifier to the unlabeled pairs of campaigns that have
some form of interactions (i.e. retweet, mentions, etc.) between them. The results
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Table 3.3: Model Performance.
Accuracy Precision Recall
Average 87.5% 98% 83.6%
Variance 0.025 0.003 0.049
are shown in the Table 3.4.
We have identified 87 disagreeing pairs of campaigns during U.S. election that
include disagreement over debate results, email controversy, etc. We have not identi-
fied any disagreement in Baseball and Friday datasets, which suggests that the cam-
paigns are not competing each other, rather they support and promote by interacting
through retweets, mentions, etc. The result suggests that while some campaign do-
mains are non-competitive in nature, others are controversial leading to disagreement
interactions.
Table 3.4: Campaign Interactions Summary.
U.S. Election Baseball Friday
Number of interactions 2790 33 140
Interactions agreement 96.88% 100% 100%
Interactions disagreement 3.11% 0.0% 0.0%
3.5 Qualitative Results
In this section, we discuss the qualitative results of BotCamp model. Section (3.5.1)
shows examples of campaigns with bot participation, for each campaign we explain its
objective and provide sample of participating bots. Section (3.5.2) demonstrates how
bots involve in different types of campaign interactions. We exploit the BotCamp
model in section (3.5.3) to extract campaign leaders and show examples of leaders.
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3.5.1 Example Campaigns
This project has identified several small to large campaigns with bot participation
in Twitter. Are they meaningful campaigns? - is the natural follow up question. We
have investigated the campaigns manually to identify their objectives. Tagging all
accounts in all campaigns is labor intensive. We take a 10% random sample of bot
accounts to identify the objective, by navigating through their profile and rendering
the last 15 tweets. In this section, we first show examples of a few campaigns from
all three datasets (see Table 3.5). We name the campaigns based on the objectives
we identified.
1. Trump Supporters: In this campaign, all bots supported candidate Trump
in U.S. presidential election in 2016. Their names, profile pictures and tweets
show that they mostly care about politics. The bot accounts show strong
retweet interactions among them.
2. Clinton Supporters: All bots in this interaction are supporting Clinton. All
their tweets are mostly political tweets. Number of Clinton supporting bots is
Table 3.5: Example campaigns in the three domains (the bot accounts may be sus-
pended currently).
Chapter 3. Bot-driven Interacting Campaign Detection 51
less than that of Trump supporting bots.
3. 100kfollowers: All bots share the same head photo template which is adver-
tising to a website called 100kfollowers.net (Figure 3.4). The bots use different
URLs that redirect to the same website to prevent detection 3. At the time of
writing they are all suspended, However, some new bots with the same behavior
and head photo started appearing after a week from old campaign suspension.
Figure 3.4: Three header photos for bots in the 100Kfollowers campaign, they all
promote to the website www.100Kfollowers.net.
4. Venezuelan Politics: All bots in this campaign are speaking in Spanish about
Venezuela politics, and hijacking popular trends of baseball games. These bots
do not retweet from each other, however, their media and hashtags interactions
have contributed to their detection.
5. Fashion: This campaign is advertising products and promotional deals. The
bots do not promote the same hashtags, however, their coordinated retweeting
3http://cs.polissocials.ml/
http://mg.elangsocial.ml/string/
http://ka.elangsocial.ml/from/
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interactions revealed their collaboration.
To provide a comprehensive picture, we show all the campaigns detected by Bot-
Camp in the U.S. election dataset on an undirected retweet graph (see Figure 3.5).
In addition to the supporters of three prominent candidates, several other small cam-
paigns exist. The two loosely connected campaigns that we labeled as Entertainment
campaigns are consisted of bots interested in variety of topics including politics, but
mostly celebrity news. We explain the weak communication between the campaigns
as an artifact of partially complete dataset. Note that Twitter API provides 1% of
tweets.
Trump
Sanders
Clinton
Entertainment
News agency
called ‘’The Hill’’
Figure 3.5: (left) Detected campaigns are shown on an undirected retweet graph (red
for Trump supporters, blue for Clinton supporters, green for Sanders supporters).
(right) Campaigns found by considering a directed retweet graph. Node in the middle
is a news agency called The Hill. Colors indicate strong sentiment polarity towards
different candidates based on hashtags.
The Figure 3.5(left) shows that politically motivated bots rarely retweet mutually
across parties. This is not surprising, however, the directed retweet graph in the
Figure 3.5(right) shows that the campaigns retweet from a common news source.
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As loyal bots mutually retweet from within the same campaign, how strongly
the bots are supporting the campaigns. To estimate that, we need to measure the
sentiment of the tweets from the bots with respect to their political polarity.
Assessing keyword sentiment for keywords such as SheWon, ImWithHer using
NLP techniques is still a challenging research problem. Instead, we manually classify
the keywords based on their sentiment towards specific party. For example, in the
U.S. Election dataset we identify 231 trends that have either negative, positive or
neutral sentiment towards specific parties (Democrats or Republicans) or products.
While some topics are controversial in nature, enforcing strong sentiment, others are
usually neutral keywords, for example, Cyber Monday.
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Figure 3.6: Histogram for labeled keyword sentiment for all the datasets.
Figure 3.6 shows the keyword sentiment for the campaigns in the three datasets.
Political campaigns show strong difference in sentiment as they can have conflicting
objectives. One can imagine conflicting objectives in sports campaigns, however, our
analysis shows that sports campaigns are still neutral in nature. The e-commerce
campaigns are mostly advertising campaigns. One observation is worth noting that
both candidates in U.S. Election dataset are discussed with more negative sentiments
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Figure 3.7: 12 bots were detected participating in three different campaigns, the bots
are plotted in the retweet graphs (colored in yellow and enlarged). Left: Baseball,
middle: Election, right: Black Friday.
than positive.
Looking at the Entertainment campaigns in the Figure 3.5, one may ask if these
bots are also interested in Black Friday or Baseball. In other words, how many bots
does BotCamp find in common across the three domains? We found only twelve
bots that appear in all the data domains. In the Figure 3.7, the common bots are
shown. These bots are all in the periphery of the graphs indicating that these bots
are not part of any campaign. Also, we compare our bots campaign with Debot
archive and found that many of these bots were detected by Debot multiple times,
which confirms their malicious behavior (see Figure 3.8).
3.5.2 Campaign Interactions
Disagreeing interactions among campaigns happen in some form of conversation be-
tween bots participating in the campaigns. Natural language conversation from bots
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Figure 3.8: Bots found at DeBot archive with their number of detections.
is surprising and unusual. However, every bot account has an owner who can post
anything (s)he likes by taking control of the automated bots. BotCamp identifies
the accounts as bots based on automated tweeting behavior, while the interactions
between bots are classified based on some turns in a conversation.
Surprising bot interactions have been discovered by BotCamp. In Figure 3.9, we
demonstrate three cases of interactions between the supporters of the candidates.
Figure 3.9(left) shows an Agreement interaction, while the remaining are Disagree-
ment interaction among bots (see Figure 3.9(middle and right)). Note that in all
of the cases, the conversations are performed by accounts that use automation to
increase their social influence. In our limited dataset, we have observed thousands
of such interactions among bot accounts.
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Figure 3.9: (left) Agreement interaction among bots. (middle and right) Disagree-
ment interactions.
3.5.3 Campaign Leaders
Bots are evolving even though social networks try their best to eliminate and sus-
pend suspicious accounts. Bots are consistently changing their behavior by picking
on human information generator. We define campaign leaders as accounts that are
responsible for leading the bots to spread certain information. We detect such ac-
counts by using the five graphs we defined earlier. We mine star structures from
these graphs and ensemble them. Star consists of one or few hub nodes connected
to spokes. We follow [53] method to decompose the graph into candidate subgraphs
using graph compression algorithm [52] then label the generated subgraphs to find
the best structure that locally minimizes the encoding cost for a given graph using
Minimum Description Length (MDL). We consider only one of the four types of
subgraph namely cliques, Bipartite Cores, stars and chains that were described in
[53].
We only consider star subgraphs as we are interested in detecting hub nodes that
act as leaders in a given graph. Table 3.6 shows the statistics for the three dataset
and their generated subgraphs. we find that the majority of political bots tend to
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adopt re-tweeting behavior for information propagation.
Table 3.6: Statistics for the subgraphs.
U.S. Election Baseball Friday
Number of stars 3,313 53 191
Number of cliques 2,076 250 642
Miami4trump StopStopHillary
Figure 3.10: Two star subgraphs identified in the U.S. Election dataset.
Traditional techniques to find influential users is not applicable in campaign
graphs. For example, betweenness centrality examine node’s important across the
whole network [22]. While this is true to detect influential nodes sharing same topic
and interest among users, campaign graphs are more complicated as they contain
several communities which are competing each other. Thus, influential nodes are
locally influencing some users with the same interest but globally considered non-
influential for other users with opposing viewpoints. The introduced method allows
us to locally identify influencers within the same community.
For example, some nodes with the highest betweenness centrality in the retweet
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graph are bots supporting other candidates (e.g. Sanders) in the green colored com-
munity in Figure 3.5. These bots are retweeting from the two opposite campaigns
(red and blue colored communities) which made them in the center of graphs to
connect different campaigns. While they are reaching many bots from different com-
munities, their contribution to their community is insignificant. We show statistics
of the extracted leaders from the three datasets below.
1. U.S. Election 1,942 bots were identified as leaders from different graphs, 135
of them have appeared in more than one graph with an average number of
spokes equals to 26. Figure 3.10 shows example of two star subgraphs.
2. Baseball 28 leaders were identified from retweet and hashtag graphs with an
average 13 spokes.
3. Friday 173 leaders identified from different graphs, 18 of these bots are found
as hubs in both retweet and temporal graphs with 15 spokes per hub on average.
While some campaigns rely on leaders to propagate their information, others use
cliques where each node acts as a hub and spoke. For example: in the U.S. Election
dataset, we find that all communications in the retweet graph are in a clique form,
which indicates roles of bots vary among different campaigns.
3.6 Conclusion
Online social media is tremendously important for the future of democratic gover-
nance. Automated activities on social media create opportunities for manipulation,
misinformation and distrust. This chapter demonstrates that social campaigns can be
corrupted by inorganic interactions among bots and develops a technique to classify
inorganic interactions among and within campaigns. We show empirical evidence
of various interactions among campaigns. However, this work is merely one step
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towards better monitored social media, significant effort must be made to protect
human users from inorganic interruptions.
60
Chapter 4
Ranking Bot Malevolence in
Twitter
4.1 Introduction
Social networks connect users around the globe. People use social networks to con-
nect with friends, follow recent updates of their favorite celebrities, share their opin-
ions, and consume news. The high impact of social network on people’s lives made
the social networks vulnerable to inappropriate usage by malevolent users.
Studies suggest that 15% of Twitter users are bots [77]. With 319 million ac-
tive Twitter users, this translates to nearly 48 million bots [64]. Bot existence has
threatened the trustworthiness of social networks. Bots cause problems ranging from
spreading spam and inappropriate content to affecting democracies by manipulat-
ing mass opinion. This urged decision-makers to look for solutions to minimize bot
growth in their platforms and eliminate their negative influence.
Suspending all bots is not possible for the hosting sites because bots are very
inexpensive to create (or to buy unethically). Bots also evolve in their purposes and
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types of actions. Moreover, bots have important usages for news media, celebrities,
politicians, etc. Social network hosts, who also sell data, do not consider suspending
all bots because bots generate content and participate in activities that increase the
overall traffic to the host sites, which leads to higher profits. Therefore, many social
sites take an approach to moderate automated behavior by limiting their activities
and by suspending only the malicious ones. For Instance, Twitter guidelines allow
automated behavior as long as it complies with their policies, such as automated
tweets and replies [2].
Existing tools [27, 61, 33] detect automated accounts on Twitter including celebri-
ties, news agencies and organizational accounts. Automation is not always an indi-
cator for malicious accounts; there are many known bots that users enjoy following
for the services they provide. @Pentametron is a bot with more than 25K followers,
which posts rhyming pairs of tweets. Botormeter reports that @Pentametron ac-
count is 64% likely to be a bot. This indicates that there is a need to shift the focus
from generalized bot detection to malicious bot detection. It’s inaccurate to assume
that all bots are bad; some bots are created for entertainment, such as @countfor-
ever account that is counting forever to entertain followers. Other bots are created
to provide certain services, such as chat-bot accounts that are widely used in social
media to answer queries and help users. In contrast, some bots are malicious, such as
the Russian account @AmelieBaldwin1 that was meddling in the U.S. election 2016
[1].
An example of a benign bot that turned into a malicious one is Tay (i.e. @TayandYou),
the Microsoft millennial AI bot that was released via Twitter in 2016. Tay was cre-
ated to mimic a 19-year-old American girl and interact with users. In less than 24
hours of its release, it started misbehaving and began tweeting racist and sexually-
charged messages after responding to users tweeting politically incorrect information.
Figure 4.1 shows how Tay’s tweets changed from positive to negative sentiments.
1 The account has been detected by Debot
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Figure 4.1: The tweets of the AI chat-bot Tay. Note the tweet messages changing
from positive to negative.
Quantifying the maliciousness is a hard task because it’s subjective and there is
no ground truth for validation. For this work, we do not quantify bots’ maliciousness
as an absolute score, but rather we address the question: how can we rank a list of
bots based on their maliciousness. We use Twitter automation rules and policies to
generate a set of features of various aspects that indicate abuse in twitter services [2].
Therefore, we rely on Twitter policies to define malicious bots as bots that misuse
the services provided by the Twitter platform and deploy them against the existing
rules and policies. We use Twitter suspension as an indicator of malicious behavior.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that studies maliciousness of
automated users in Twitter and ranks them in order of their malevolence.
Ranking social bot malevolence has various applications; it can be deployed as a
recommendation system to advise users to unfollow the most malicious bots. Also, it
can help in evaluating different bot detection techniques based on their effectiveness.
Hence, instead of quantifying the goodness of detection techniques based on the
number of detected bots, we can quantify it by the percentage of malicious bots
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detected. The more malicious the detected bots are, the more efficient the detection
technique is since it allows us to take further action on these accounts (e.g. temporal
suspension).
In this work, we propose a real-time ranking system for bots on Twitter. The
goal of this work is to answer the following questions:
1. How can we rank bots based on their maliciousness?
2. Can we differentiate between benign and malicious bots?
3. How do we estimate the utility of existing bot detection techniques?
4.2 Background and Related Work
4.2.1 Learning to Rank
Learning to Rank algorithms (LTR) are widely used in the Information Retrieval
field. The formal definition of the ranking problem is as follows: given a query
with a list of documents, sort the list of documents based on the degree of relevance
and similarity with the query. LTR is used in various applications (e.g. documents
retrieval and online advertisement) and is at the core of many search engines. In
general, ranking models are divided into three main approaches: pointwise, pairwise,
and listwise [59]. The simplest approach is pointwise where we predict the numer-
ical/ordinal value for each document, then the list is sorted based on the ranking
score. This enables the problem to be approximated by a regression problem to pre-
dict the list order. In pairwise, the ranker is trained on pairs of documents rather
than single documents to predict the most relevant one, with the goal to minimize
the number of inversions in the ordered list. In listwise, the query and list are treated
as a single learning instance, where the learning function tries to learn the order by
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considering the whole list of documents. This approach can be fairly complex to train
as it needs to find the ranking proprieties for a given list. In this work, we follow
the pointwise approach for bots ranking, where the ranking function is learned by
training a deep neural network to learn the ordinal score for bot maliciousness.
4.2.2 Bot Detection
Detecting bots on social media has gained a lot of attention lately, especially after
the U.S. Presidential election in 2016 [6, 12]. Bot detection techniques are helpful
tools for measuring bot growth on social networks. However, detecting bots alone is
not enough to evaluate their impact on the platform as we cannot assume all bots
generate similar traces; bots vary in their nature, objectives, and maliciousness.
Therefore, some existing research has focused on profiling bots to differentiate
their types and objectives. For example, political bots trying to sway public opinion
and affect democracies is incomparable to chat-bots that aim to answer customer
service and provide a better experience for the users. Most of the existing work in
the literature has focused on classifying bots into predefined categories and profiling
bots based on some aspects of abusive behavior without taking into consideration
the benign bots [65].
4.2.3 Related Work
Bot Detection. There have been several proposed bot detection techniques, most
are either supervised or unsupervised methods. Botornot [33] is an unsupervised
bot detection framework that extracts features from meta-data and information to
determine whether an account is a bot or not. Debot [27] and BotWalk [61] are
unsupervised models, the first uses temporal activities correlation, and the latter is
based on the ensemble of outlier detection algorithms in multi-dimensional behavioral
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space.
Researchers have studied bot types to better understand their motivation. In
[65], bots have been categorized based on their behavior which includes broadcast,
consumption, and spam bots. The work, however, does not distinguish between
benign and malicious bots. Other studies have focused on studying one aspect of
bot maliciousness, such as spamming [83, 75].
Learning to Rank. Ranking has been used in hashtag recommendations for hy-
perlinked tweets [72] and the assessment of tweet content credibility [49]. In [69],
authors propose a supervised ranking model to rank social accounts based on the
degree of their bot relevance by using learning to rank algorithms. Authors combine
features from well-known bot detection methods (e.g. Debot and BotorNot) to gen-
erate static and query-based features for each query. While their work examines bot
relevance, our work focuses on ranking the malicious degree of bots to help differen-
tiate between benign bots (e.g. customer service) and malicious bots (e.g. political
campaigns). Our work is unique because it can be exploited as a recommendation
system to help users clean their followee lists, and help in evaluating the existing
bot detection algorithms for a better assessment of the bot’s utility. Ranking bots
based on their maliciousness score has not been studied before to the best of our
knowledge.
4.3 Framework
Figure 4.2 shows the overall framework of our system. In the first step, we collect
bot activities using the filter method in the Twitter API. Then, we form the time
series of each feature at every window. Next, we label each feature time series into
four categories: Aggregated features (fwij ); AvgChange features (∆f
wi
j ); Successive
features (∆f
wi|wi−1
j ); and Change of change features (∆
2fwij ). We refer to this step as
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Feature Transformation. For the ranking model, we train a Deep Neural Networks
using multiple hidden layers to predict the maliciousness score for each bot at a
given time, then we sort the list where the top bots in the list have the highest
maliciousness scores in a given query. In the next subsections (4.3.1 to 4.3.4), we
describe the details of each step and evaluate the proposed ranking model.
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Figure 4.2: The overall framework for our ranking model.
4.3.1 Data Collection
In this work, we use the most recent bot detection methods to capture different
behavioral patterns to expand both the quantity and types of detected bots. The
three bot detection methods we used are BotOrNot, Debot, and BotWalk [33, 27,
61]. We collected a list of bots from each method by continuously listening to the
set bots from May 2018 to September, 2018 and collecting their tweets over the
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Table 4.1: Dataset Statistics.
Dataset Name Number of Accounts Annotation Method
Debot 15,628 dynamic time wrapping
BotOrNot 3,604 classification
BotWalk 2,396 outlier detection
Humans 926 human annotators
four-month period. The data was collected using Twitter API and Tweepy Python
library. Simultaneously, we checked every two hours to see if any bots got suspended
during the listening time. To study benign behavior, we use the dataset provided by
this work [30] where they collected a set of organic human accounts using Amazon
Mechanical Turks. We use human users to study benign behavior since human nature
does not carry malicious behavior. Therefore, many benign bots, such as chat-bots
are built based on mimicking human behavior. Table 4.1 shows the statistics for the
four datasets used in this work.
4.3.2 Feature Selection
In this section, we study various reasons for Twitter suspension and create a set
of features that characterize malicious behavior for bots that do not comply with
Twitter guidelines and most often result in account suspension [2]. Our features
can be divided into four categories: Spam behavior, Fake and biased news, Hate
speech, and Metadata. For each category, we describe a subset of the features and
the intuition behind their importance.
4.3.2.1 Spam Behavior
Spam is defined by an aggressive behavior that attempts to drive users’ attention
to certain products or services. This includes posting misleading links, duplicate
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mentions, and hijacking trends.
To shed light on this undesired behavior, we create a list of features that captures
this type of abuse. For each user, we find features related to four types of spams.
The feautes are:
1. URL Spam
Several existing works have identified suspicious URLs for phishing, spam, and
malware distribution by looking at lexical, redirect chains and landing URL
features of a given URL [56, 60]. Therefore, we created a set of 35 features
that characterize the URLs such as the number of distinct URLs, landing URLs,
and the length of redirect chains.
2. Hashtag Spam
Another form of spam is taking advantage of trending hashtags and related
topics. To quantify the hashtag usage in spamming behavior, we measure bot
participation in hashtags by computing the number of hashtags within a tweet
and across all tweets.
3. Mention Spam
Some bots try to attract random users by mentioning the users in tweets, hoping
that the mentioned users will respond and interact with their tweets. According
to Twitter automation rules and policies for automated mentions, “The reply
and mention functions are intended to make communication between Twitter
users easier. Automating these actions to reach many users on an unsolicited
basis is an abuse of the feature, and is not permitted.” [2]. Thus, we look for
users who send a large number of mentions to other users and measure their
average number of mentions per tweets and across all tweets.
4. Retweet Spam
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Engaging in randomly or aggressively retweeting acts does not comply with
Twitter rules [10]. Hence, we create features related to the number of retweets
a bot is involved in, and whether the retweets are from a certain user or random
users.
4.3.2.2 Fake and Biased News
Distributing false and misleading information has been the center of attention in
recent years. Therefore, social media platforms are under continuous pressure to
tackle this kind of abuse and provide a reliable environment for their users. Study-
ing Fake and biased news is controversial in nature, thus, for the scope of our work
we only measure user’s interaction with news sources that are labeled as fake or
biased based on existing datasets. We use Opensources2 database, which is a pro-
fessionally curated list of labeled online information sources. We only consider news
sources that are labeled as Fake, extremely Biased, or Unreliable. Also, we use two
other databases, Mediabiasfactcheck 3 and Allsides4 that have extremely biased news
sources. We used the three datasets to measure users’ interaction with fake/biased
news sources by tweets, re-tweets, and shared links.
4.3.2.3 Hate Speech
According to Twitter rules and policies for automation: “You may not engage in any
automated activity that encourages, promotes, or incites abuse, violence, hateful
conduct, or harassment, on or off Twitter” [2]. Yet, some users have disrupted this
platform to disseminate hate targeting people or groups, Tay is an example of a bot
that tweeted hate speech on Twitter (see Figure 4.1).
2www.opensources.co
3www.mediabiasfactcheck.com
4www.allsides.com
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Previous work has used sentiment analysis as a feature for hate speech detection
since hate speech has negative polarity [47, 58, 34]. Therefore, we use VaderSen-
timent, a lexicon and rule-based sentiment analysis tool, to measure sentiment ex-
pressed in social media [46]. We evaluate the bots’ sentiment polarity and intensity
expressed in tweets, and measure their overall sentiment.
4.3.2.4 Metadata
Metadata are features that characterize user profiles and reveal their identities. Ma-
licious bots often attempt to hide their identity. We investigate bot features that
reveal bots pretending not to be automated, such as geo-enabled tweets and location
change via the Twitter REST API. Some bots use unethical approaches to increase
their followers [4, 3], so we consider features like the number of followers and follow-
ing.
From the above discussed features, we use the Twitter API and the Tweepy
Python library to listen to bots and collect a set of 113 features. For each feature,
we create a time series of the value of the feature at every second for all of the bot
accounts. The full list of features is made public in the supporting webpage [7].
4.3.3 Feature Transformation
Bot behavior can be rapidly changed by the botmasters based on their current objec-
tive. Bots can be switched to another campaign group [27], which results in different
levels of maliciousness for the same bot; a benign bot could become malicious and
vice versa. Hence, we take the duration into consideration and divide the time series
of each feature into intervals (w) where wi is a non-overlapping sliding window at
time i. For each window, we compute the average aggregated features over the inter-
val [i− 1, i]. This allows us to rank bots over sliding windows instead of an absolute
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rank for their whole life.
Studying the change of features along with the feature values is important when
studying bot behavior. In general, the features described in section 4.3.2 can be either
increasing/decreasing or static. However, to capture sudden changes, we expand the
feature space to measure the percentage change and change of change (i.e. second
order differences) for different intervals as follows: For each feature, we divide its
time series into t intervals where wi is a sliding window at time i. Let f
wi
j be feature
j at time window wi, then we compute AvgChange(f
wi
j ), SuccessiveChange(f
wi
j )
and ChangeOfChange(fwij ) as follows:
AvgChange
(
fwij
)
= ∆fwij =
fwij − 1t
∑t
i=1 f
wi
j
1
t
∑t
i=1 f
wi
j
× 100 (4.1)
SuccessiveChange
(
fwij
)
= ∆f
wi|wi−1
j =
fwij − fwi−1j
f
wi−1
j
× 100 (4.2)
ChangeOfChange
(
fwij
)
= ∆2fwij
=
∆f
wi|wi−1
j − 1t
∑t
i=2 ∆f
wi|wi−1
j
1
t
∑t
i=2 ∆f
wi|wi−1
j
× 100 (4.3)
Where AvgChange(fwij ) finds the overall percentage difference for wi with the aver-
age windows, SuccessiveChange(fwij ) measures the percentage change of wi with the
previous window, and ChangeOfChange(fwij ) computes the percentage change of wi
with the average SuccessiveChange for all windows.
Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of AvgChange of the last window before the
suspension for a set of bots. For each category, we show the top three features
with the highest average increase. Note that while spam and fake features do not
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of AvgChange of the last window before the suspension for
different features categories.
show significant increase in the features, both hate and metadata features show
higher increase right before the suspension. This shows how time is a key element to
consider when studying the behavior (i.e. bots’ maliciousness score at time t is not
necessarily the same at t + 1 nor t− 1).
Thus, instead of treating bots as a one learning instance to estimate the mali-
ciousness score, we treat the sliding window as an instance of learning. This means
a bot will have multiple scores depending on the time window, and will enable con-
sideration of a bot’s behavioral change when studying their degree of maliciousness.
We generate four sets of features for each window wi using features defined in
section 4.3.2 as follows:
1. Aggregated features over time.
2. Average change features (∆fwij ) [Equation 4.1].
3. Successive change features (∆f
wi|wi−1
j ) [Equation 4.2].
4. Change of change features (∆2fwij ) [Equation 4.3].
Chapter 4. Ranking Bot Malevolence in Twitter 73
We create a comprehensive feature space to better understand behavioral changes.
The total number of features for a given window after transformation is 565.
4.3.4 Ranking Model
In this section, we describe the training and validation data and discuss the proposed
model design and architecture.
Training and Testing Data. One of the main challenges to this work is that we
have no ground truth to train a model. Moreover, human users often unknowingly
follow bots on Twitter; thus, human annotators perform imperfectly when creating
ground truth labels. In addition, the level of malevolence is dynamic over time,
which makes it a very expensive and inefficient task to annotate bots at every time
interval. Therefore, we rely on Twitter’s suspension mechanism as an indicator of
behavioral change with the assumption that suspended bots have higher likelihood
of being malicious than active bots. This is intuitive since most account suspensions
occur due to user reports, failure to reply to challenge questions, or violations of
Twitter rules [2].
We use the data described in Table 4.1 to build our training and validation data
using suspended bots and humans. For suspended bots, we find a set of bots that
were suspended during data collection from the three datasets BorOrNot, Debot, and
BotWalk [33, 27, 61], which has a total of 749 bots. We filter out bots that do not
have sufficient tweets and keep 676 bots that have at least four days of data. For
those bots, we give the final window before bot suspension a score of 1 and label
it as Malicious, and the remaining windows a score of 0.5 with the label Medium.
This ranking complies with the assumption that the final window for bots before
suspension should have higher maliciousness scores than other windows during their
lifetime. For the Humans dataset, we assign all windows in a score of 0 and label
them as Benign since random humans generally are not malicious.
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Table 4.2: Training and validation data statistics.
Label Name Value Number of Bots
Malicious 1 676
Medium 0.5 15, 197
Benign 0 3, 863
Table 4.2 shows the statistics for the training and validation data. We use 5-fold
cross validation using stratified sampling to ensure the percentage of samples for
each fold are equal. Then, in the training set, we follow the random oversampling
technique to create an equal distribution for all classes. For each sample in the
majority class, we randomly select with replacement a sample from the minority
class.
Note that our training and validation data are on windows rather than bot in-
stances since bots have different ranking scores at different times. We set the window
size to two days. This parameter is an estimation based on the fact that Twitter API
has restrictions on the number of tweets and we need enough accumulated tweets to
classify abusive behavior.
Multilayer Perceptron Model. In order to rank bots, we employ a Multilayer
Perceptron Model (MLP) for linear regression prediction. MLP is a class of feed-
forward artificial neural network which is a stack of linear layers. There are three
layers of nodes types: input layer, hidden layer, and output layer. We use Keras
MLP implementation for running the experiments [31].
Model Architecture. The first layer is the input layer which takes the transformed
features of a bot window instance. The input layer is fully connected to four hidden
layers. Each hidden layer is followed by a dropout layer of values (0.4, 0.3, 0.2,
0.2), respectively to prevent overfitting and ensure the model is learning more robust
features during the training [73]. We use ReLu as an activation function for all
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hidden layers to ensure the output values are always positive:
Relu(x) = max(0, x)
The output layer has a sigmoid activation function to predict the probability
between the range [0, 1] and is defined as follows:
Sig(x) =
1
1 + e−x
The output of the model represents bot maliciousness scores at a given time. Each
bot will have different maliciousness scores at different times, with the expectation
that the score before the suspension is the highest.
Model Performance. To evaluate the performance of our model, we use two
known evaluation metrics for regression models: Mean Squared Error (MSE) and
Mean Absolute Error (MAE) which are defined as follows:
MSE =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(Yi − Yˆi)2 , MAE =
∑n
i=1
∣∣∣Yi − Yˆi∣∣∣
n
Our model achieves an average of 0.046 in MSE with 0.005 standard deviation
and an average of 0.152 in MAE with 0.014 standard deviation. In the next section,
we show different evaluation experiments for the proposed model.
4.4 Experimental Evaluation
We design a set of validation experiments to help evaluate our model and answer the
following questions:
1. Is our ranking model effective in ranking bots based on their maliciousness?
2. Can we evaluate different bot detection techniques?
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4.4.1 Deep Learned Model Evaluation
Experimental Evaluation: For this validation experiment, we use a new set of
bots and listen to these accounts for a three-month period. We collect bot features
and use the ranking model to predict their maliciousness scores over all the windows.
After data collection, we check the bots and find the suspended accounts. We label
the bots using two classes: Suspended versus Active bots. In Figure 4.4, we show the
distribution of all maliciousness scores for both Suspended and Active bots. We can
observe how each class has a different probability density function, where the area
under each curve is normalized to 1.
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Figure 4.4: Histogram and kernel density estimate for Suspended vs Active bots’
maliciousness scores.
Table 4.3 shows some statistical analysis for the two classes. Suspended bots have
much higher maliciousness scores than Active bots, which shows how our model can
differentiate between the malicious versus benign bots not only before suspension,
but also during their lifetime.
Comparison with Existing Methods: Existing work has focused on detecting
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Table 4.3: Active vs suspended bots statistics.
Active Bots Suspended Bots
Number of bots 606 83
Number of windows 20, 364 2, 765
Mean 0.17 0.80
Variance 0.07 0.03
Skewness 1.71 −2.21
bots and classifying them into predefined groups (e.g. spammers and self-promoters).
To our best knowledge, there is no work on predicting bot maliciousness. Therefore,
we chose to compare our model with BotOrNot. BotOrNot gives each bot a score, and
higher scores indicate more bot-like behavior. While the BotOrNot scoring system
does not explicitly represent maliciousness, we found it the closest to our work since
bot-like behavior usually carries malicious activities.
From the dataset discussed in the previous section, we use the BotOrNot bots
and compare the two techniques based on the two evaluation metrics MSE and
MAE with the variance. Table 4.4 shows the performance for both techniques. Our
model outperforms BotOrNot in both MSE the MAE. This illustrates how having
information about suspension can help to identify maliciousness, and relying on bot
detection techniques alone is not sufficient.
Table 4.4: BotOrNot vs our model evaluation using MSE and MAE with variance.
Evaluation Metric BotOrNot Our Model
MSE 0.079 (±0.001) 0.028 (±0.002)
MAE 0.275 (±0.003) 0.114 (±0.015)
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4.4.2 Model Ranking Evaluation
To evaluate our model ranking performance for a given set of bots, we first predict the
maliciousness score for each bot and then sort the list. Malicious bots are expected
to be at the top of the list with the highest scores, while benign bots are expected
to be at the bottom of the list with the lowest scores.
To evaluate our ranking model, we use Label Ranking Average Precision (LRAP)
metric. For a given binary matrix of ground truth labels y ∈ {0, 1}nsamples×nlabels and
the predicted score associated with each label fˆ ∈ Rnsamples×nlabels , LRAP is defined
as:
LRAP (y, fˆ) =
1
nsamples
nsamples−1∑
i=0
1
||yi||0
∑
j:yij=1
|Lij|
rankij
where Lij =
{
k : yik = 1, fˆik ≥ fˆij
}
, rankij =
∣∣∣{k : fˆik ≥ fˆij}∣∣∣, | · | computes the
cardinality of the set, and || · ||0 is the `0 norm (nonzero elements in a vector)[23].
To calculate the LRAP metric, we create binary ground truth labels, where both
Malicious and Medium labels are assigned a non-zero value and Benign label is
assigned a zero value. We randomly generate 500 queries; each query contains a
random set of window instances. Using the generated binary ground truth labels
and the predicted maliciousness scores, we find the average reported LRAP for all
queries is 99.66%.
We evaluate the ranking model using the validation data, we compute the LRAP
where we treat the validation data as a single query, our model achieves on average
LRAP of 94.29% with standard deviation of 0.007.
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Figure 4.5: The maliciousness scores for Debot, BotWalk and BorOrNot.
4.4.3 Bot Detection Techniques Evaluation
We investigate the effectiveness of bot detection techniques based on their ability to
detect malicious bots. We consider BotOrNot, Debot, and BotWalk in this experi-
ment. We sample 300 random bots per technique, then use our model to predict the
maliciousness score for each instance. Figure 4.5 shows the score distribution for the
three methods. Note that Debot, BotOrNot, and BotWalk have the highest average
scores, respectively, and Debot has the lowest variance among the three techniques.
This shows how some bot detection techniques are better in detecting malicious bots.
In general, most detected bots are malicious in nature; yet, they are not suspended
by Twitter. These bots continue to disrupt the trustworthiness of the platform and
threatens users safety. Until Twitter is able to take actions, more research should
be focused on bots maliciousness to shed light on this problem and make users more
aware of bots.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose a ranking model to help estimate the malicious behavior
of bots in social media. We show how measuring the malicious degree of bots is
significantly more important than identifying the degree of bot relevance. We perform
experiments to evaluate the performance of our ranking model, achieving an average
precision of 94.29%. We also perform a validation experiment on a different set
of bots to show how our model can differentiate between benign and malevolence
bots.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
The main goal of this dissertation is to identify various forms of promotional cam-
paigns in social media, and to show the roles of bots and users in such campaigns.
We investigate promotional campaigns in both online e-commerce sites and social
networks, and explain the impact of these campaigns on the trustworthiness of social
media. The key challenges in this work are the absence of ground truth data and
the diverse forms of promotional campaigns which result in hard-to-detect malicious
activities across promoters.
We study reviews in online e-commerce sites and identify a new type of abuse in
review systems which is incentivized reviews. We use a dictionary based technique
to extract app names and code words in a highly precise manner from close to a
million apps. Our system is able to detect promotional reviews with 91% precision
and extract codes with 93% precision, and can successfully detect and extract the
app names with 95% precision.
To identify abusive incentivized reviews, we develop a novel relational ensembling
technique for outlier detection, that reduces bias in the resulting outliers by relating
outliers from multiple entities (e.g. apps, users and reviews). Our method identifies
a set of abusive incentivized reviews, such as automated, spamming, targeting and
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hidden-beneficiary reviews. We generate novel features to help the subspace anomaly
detection methods reducing the variance. The key observation is that our novel
features harness stronger agreement compared to the agreement produced by the
given-features among the three independently ranked lists of outliers. We also find
that most outlier reviews (around 90%) have at least an outlier app or an outlier user
when we use our novel features. We observe that the precision of perfect agreement
is higher than the precision of partial agreement. In contrast, the recall of partial
agreement is higher than the recall of perfect agreement.
In chapter 3, We study bots’ involvement in campaigns and show how they are
exploiting the organic popularity of social campaigns. We created BotCamp, a sys-
tem to detect bot-driven interaction in campaigns. BotCamp performs multi-aspect
(i.e. temporal, textual, and topographical) clustering of bots. We develop a heuristic
cluster ensembling approach to combine communities detected from different graphs.
We find that the retweets and temporal clusters score the highest agreement with the
predicted labels which show the importance of these graphs in detecting campaigns.
We develop an automatic interaction classifier to discover novel interactions among
bots participating in social campaigns with 98% precision. The results suggest that
our feature set can capture the agreement and disagreement interactions success-
fully. We have identified 87 disagreeing pairs of campaigns during U.S. election that
include disagreement over debate results, email controversy, etc. We have not iden-
tified any disagreement in Baseball and Friday datasets, which suggests that the
campaigns are not competing with each other, rather they support and promote
by interacting through retweets and mentions. The results show that while some
campaign domains are non-competitive in nature, others are controversial leading to
disagreement interactions.
To identify malicious bots, we propose a real-time ranking system for bots on
Twitter. We create a comprehensive feature set and behavioral profile to character-
ize malicious bots and capture different aspects of malicious behavior. We show how
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time is a key element to consider when studying the behavior since a bot could have
different maliciousness scores during its lifetime. We use a deep learned model to
produce a ranking score. Our model is trained on a novel dataset of suspended bots
and achieves 94.29% precision in ranking the bots, and can predict malicious bots
successfully before suspension. We illustrate how having information about suspen-
sion can help identifying maliciousness, and relying on bot detection techniques alone
is not sufficient to study malicious behavior. We compare between three bot detec-
tion techniques and show that Debot [27] and BotOrNot [33] are better in detecting
malicious bots, respectively.
For future work, there are three main directions that this work could be expanded,
we briefly discuss them and show some use cases:
1. Referral Incentives on App Reviews. We study incentivized reviews in
Google Play store platform. The algorithms described in chapter 2 may ap-
pear to be specialized for incentivized review mining in the Google Play store.
However, the high-level architecture of the system is easily generalizable with
necessary domain knowledge. For example, a domain expert can easily pro-
duce the whiteList, blackList, and whiteNames lists for his domain. A similar
identifier list for other entities such as hotels, books, etc. are also available to
domain experts. Thus, one future direction is to expand our system to measure
the incentivized reviews in other domains and estimate their impact on other
review platforms such as TripAdvisor and Amazon.
2. Bot-driven Interacting Campaign Detection. For this work we use DeBot
system to find bot-driven campaigns and study their interactions, one future
direction is to incorporate other bot detection techniques (e.g. BotOrNot and
BotWalk) to detect various bot types since bots keep evolving to prevent their
suspension, and bots participating in campaigns are not necessarily temporally
correlated. One of the challenges to this work is Twitter API restrictions
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which limit the amount of data that we can process. One possible direction is
to implement BotCamp framework as a distributed architecture to collect more
data and detect larger campaigns, even when the bots are passively spreading
content at a relatively lower rate.
3. Ranking Bot Malevolence in Twitter. In this work, we study bots mali-
cious behavior in Twitter. One future direction for this work is to deploy the
system in real time and detect malicious bots before their suspension. Another
direction is to use the system as a tool to monitor users and keep the accounts
alive by tracking their maliciousness score to prevent Twitter suspension.
Overall, this dissertation portrays a bleak picture of social networks where promo-
tional campaigns are abusing this modern marvel in order gain competitive advantage
over other campaigns, and sometimes over the humans in general. The true resolu-
tion will need a social reform about how online social media is perceived, which is
beyond the discipline of Computer Science.
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